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Abstract 
 
This study assesses trends of the political environment of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) 
between the period of 2004 and 2012 pertaining to contentions of two differing models of 
conflict regulation, the consociational and integrative, which apply to BiH. As each model 
has contentions pertaining to voting patterns, political elite behaviour, and on the workings 
of institutions, this study conducts an analysis through the assessment of election results, 
compliance with power-sharing arrangements and the nature of coalition building, and the 
workings of a consociational institution to reach its findings. The current system is deemed 
as being largely ineffective. In addition, since there is pressure to introduce more 
integrative measures to the power-sharing structure in BiH, the aim is to assess how the 
trends in the political environment have fared from the period a similar study was 
conducted in order to reach recommendations on whether or not to further support the 
utilization of consociational elements. The analysis in this study portrays that the trends 
hold more true for the contentions pertaining to the consociational model. Although the 
findings are not conclusive at first, new developments further favour the consociational 
model. Also, integrative measures were found to be the source of the problem when 
analyzing compliance with power-sharing arrangements. Therefore, the suggestion 
conveyed is that instead of diverting away from the use of consociational elements there 
should be an encouragement to improve them. 
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Section 1: Introduction and Background 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
 Elements of consociational democracy play a significant role in the power-sharing 
system that is currently in place in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Within the Dayton 
Peace Agreement (DPA), which marked the end of the conflict in BiH in the 90s, is where 
the guidelines for the governing structure of BiH are set. The DPA can be described as a 
typical example of consociational settlement especially when considering the institutional 
framework it has produced and influenced (Belloni, 2004, p. 336). However, the DPA also 
comprises elements of the integrative approach. These two approaches of the consociational 
and integrative models represent the two most advocated structures for regulating conflict 
in deeply segmented societies (Caspersen, 2004, p. 570-571).  
 The dilemma facing the political structure in BiH is in which direction the balance 
should be shifting between the two approaches, or if it should be shifting at all. What seems 
to be puzzling in BiH is that there is a call for a more integrative approach when it is still 
quite clear that such provisions are not favoured by two of the three constituent peoples. It 
should also be expected that, for the most part, any group constituting a minority in a 
particular situation would not be satisfied with integrative provisions. In short, the 
difference between the two approaches is that while the integrative approach transcends 
ethnic divisions, the consociational approach advances a political structure built on the 
basis of diverging segments, which separates the groups instead of integrating them. The 
approach from the consociational standpoint is to guarantee the diverging sides a share in 
power and to accommodate them on their claims to self-determination. However, the 
consociational approach tends to freeze ethnic divisions and is slammed for being 
ineffective for governance, meanwhile the integrative approach is slated for resembling a 
majoritarian system which lacks in the protection of minority rights (Caspersen, 2004, p. 
571-572).  
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 The society in BiH is divided along ethnic lines where the main identifying 
indicator is religious affiliation. The three main ethnic groups within BiH are the Bosniaks, 
Serbs and Croats. These groups also constitute the constituent peoples of BiH. The citizens 
who do not identify themselves as one of the three constituent peoples of BiH are at a 
disadvantage in the political sphere with regards to representation and special rights, and 
thus fit in the category of 'others'. In addition, there is disagreement, as the political elite in 
BiH are not in congruence with how the state should be structured (i.e., more decentralized 
or more integrated and centralized). The Bosniaks are the more populous of the ethnic 
groups and the elite representative of this group advocate for a more centralized system, 
whereas the elite representative of  the Serbs and Croats are more driven towards 
supporting a decentralized structure of governance. To accommodate for their differences 
in interest, and opinion, a complex system of power-sharing was established where no one 
side has the ability to make decisions on vital issues without the consent of the other two, 
or at least it is very difficult.  
 Even though no side is truly satisfied, to say the least, with this system envisioned 
by the DPA, it is the one which the citizens of BiH have to live with. Improving such a 
system would require the revision of both consociational and integrative elements. 
Caspersen (2004) used BiH as a case study for a comparison of the effect the integrative 
and consociational models have on stability. The elements of each approach were isolated 
and then their effects were compared. She concludes that the consociational model has been 
better in fostering stability, but also that an implementation of both of the approaches at the 
same time can promote moderation. It was also stressed that there was an increase on the 
emphasis of the integrative measures within the DPA, and that new measures were being 
introduced (Caspersen, 2004, p. 573). The methods utilized by Caspersen are an assessment 
of election results, observations of coalition building and compliance with power-sharing 
arrangements by politicians, and the workings of institutions. These methods were utilized 
in order to examine the contentions the consociational and integrative models have 
pertaining to voting patterns, political elite behaviour, and workings of institutions.  
 Since the governing structure in BiH, to a large extent, resembles a consociational 
settlement, and considering that it is regarded as largely ineffective, it is understandable as 
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to why there is an increase on the emphasis of the integrative measures and a push to 
introduce more of them. Despite this, though, the argument pursued in this thesis is that the 
political environment in BiH is fit for consociational elements, and instead of deviating 
away from the use of consociational elements there should be an encouragement to improve 
them. With a current study the aim is to see how the trends in the political environment in 
BiH have fared since Caspersen's study in order to reach recommendations on whether or 
not to support consociational elements and their improvement in BiH. The study mainly 
takes place between the period of 2004 to 2012. The trends of the political environment are 
assessed through the same methods utilized in Caspersen (2004), which have been 
mentioned above. This study is important because with the push for a more integrative 
approach, while the political environment may be fit for a more consociational approach, 
deviating from the consociational elements may be a move too risky to act on today and in 
the sooner years to come. One trend which was surprising, as expressed by Caspersen, was 
that there was a decline in the support for nationalist parties, which implies a moderation in 
the attitudes of the public. In addition, she indicated that moderation may develop faster in 
residentially heterogeneous areas as she recorded a significant decrease in nationalist 
support in heterogeneous municipalities (Caspersen, 2004, p. 575-577). This trend in 
particular does not favour the contentions of the consociational model, but with new 
developments in the political arena, as in the emergence of new political parties and the 
occurrence of some disruptive political crises, it is questioning whether or not the trends 
have continued along such a path towards moderation. Therefore, in the midst of calls for 
more integrative measures it would be useful to give insight on the political environment in 
BiH and if it is fit for consociational democracy prior to a potential shift away from 
consociational elements. By assessing the contentions of the two models to conflict 
regulation recommendations can be made depending on how trends have fared since 
Caspersen's study.  
 The consociational and integrative models each have contentions pertaining to 
voting patterns, political elite behaviour, and workings of institutions, which are used to 
gauge the political environment in relation to the two approaches. Voting patterns from 
election to election will depict within which municipalities more nationalist voting is 
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prevalent, either within the heterogeneous or homogenous ones. The consociational model 
holds that heterogeneous units will foster greater extremism. However, the integrative 
model contends that moderation and inter-ethnic cooperation will be fostered in 
heterogeneous units. Political elite behaviour is then assessed through the willingness of the 
elite to engage in inter-ethnic cooperation (i.e., attempts in coalition building and respect 
towards power-sharing arrangements) (Caspersen, 2004, p. 574). The consociational model 
professes that the political leaders from diverging groups will come together in order to 
avoid dangers posed by a society divided along hostile subcultures, that is when they 
become aware of such dangers (Lijphart, 1969, p. 211-212). The integrative model 
contends that in heterogeneous units elected politicians will show willingness and ability to 
engage in inter-ethnic cooperation. Regarding the institutions the consociational model 
conveys that integrative institutions will not be welcomed and will face difficulties in 
getting established, and, on the other hand, the integrative model holds that the 
consociational institutions will be faced with ineffectiveness and deadlock (Caspersen, 
2004, p. 574). Appropriate recommendations can then be made after assessing the political 
environment on the basis of these contentions. Therefore, the argument relevant to this 
thesis would be supported if trends favour the contentions pertaining to the consociational 
model and portray that the opposite is occurring to that which the integrative model 
contends. The research questions then are: how have these trends, regarding the political 
environment, based on the contentions of both models, fared since the study was last 
conducted and what can this tell us about the prospects of the further utilization of 
consociational elements in the power-sharing system of BiH?  
 The analysis in this study portrays that the trends hold more true for the contentions 
pertaining to the consociational model. First, it is not convincing that public attitudes are 
shifting towards moderation as Caspersen concluded, since the voting share for nationalist 
support, which is recorded in this current study, is higher than that of which was recorded 
by Caspersen (2004) for the elections in 2000 and 2002. In addition, the nationalist voting 
share is higher in heterogeneous municipalities than in homogenous ones, and there are no 
indications of changes in the trend to show otherwise. Also, all the cases which had issues 
with power-sharing arrangements were heterogeneous ones, as elected politicians were 
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reluctant to engage in inter-ethnic cooperation. Furthermore, the disruptions in the 
governing of BiH has highly been due to integrative measures as they are not being 
welcomed and are facing difficulties in getting established. However, two trends which 
seem to weaken the argument of this thesis are that leaders are not effectively forming 
coalitions to avoid dangers posed by a society divided along hostile subcultures and that the 
consociational institution, the Parliament, is faced with ineffectiveness. However, the 
workings of this consociational institution was more effective during the period between 
2006-2010 compared to when Caspersen conducted her study, and it only slowed when 
there were disruptions resulting from the backlash towards integrative measures. There are 
also new developments which show a turn in events as the new governing coalition has 
come to terms on a new deal concerning reforms and progress in the Parliament seems to be 
picking up as, recently, a new law of importance was passed. Therefore, in this study the 
case, then, is made for the improvement on the already established consociational elements 
within the power-sharing governance of BiH.  
 There are a few countries within the European context which have faced, in the past 
two decades, violent conflict and now have to accommodate for ethnic divisions. They are 
all, of course, of great importance to the understanding of post-conflict states. However, 
considering that, in BiH, each of the main ethnic groups make up a substantial proportion 
of the population and that the influence each of these groups have on the politics is 
significant, it makes it an interesting case study in itself. In addition, after the extent of the 
violent conflict, it is a fascinating phenomenon in how shortly after processes started for 
participation in international organizations and the cooperation with the EU in order to set 
the path for potential membership. Though, the latter is far from being realized. The BiH 
governing structure is a greatly complex system of power-sharing, which attempts to 
manage the conflict-ridden society. Such a system is rarely envisioned in other deeply 
segmented countries. Moreover, this study is relevant in the broader context of the field, 
since power-sharing regimes incorporating consociational elements are set up in many post-
conflict states, or have potential to be utilized in their governing structures, such as in 
Burundi, Northern Ireland, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Iraq, Macedonia, 
Israel, Nigeria, Rwanda and in possibly many other deeply segmented states, like India. 
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Hence, the points covered in this study can be relevant for, and be applied to, other deeply 
segmented societies. In general, it will be an addition to the literature on consociationalism, 
power-sharing and post-conflict management.  
 Furthermore, this work is split up into several sections. The first section includes the 
introduction and background. The background portion of this section is a brief overview of 
recent history and the differences present in the society of BiH. It demonstrates why a 
power-sharing system was introduced to BiH. In addition, the nature of divisions depicted 
in this subchapter alludes to why a power-sharing system is further required. There is also a 
brief description of the political parties as they are important for the understanding of the 
analysis section. The theoretical framework portion of the thesis covers what the theory of 
consociationalism contends, how it started, where it has been utilized, what it has been 
criticized for, and how it has expanded its relevance to post-conflict and developing 
countries. The integrative approach is also analyzed in this section. A literature review is 
also included as a section. It incorporates a summary of Caspersen's study. Additionally, 
this section's purpose is to describe the power-sharing governance in BiH and in the ways it 
resembles consociational power-sharing, and also where the shortcomings lie, in order to 
portray that there is room for improvement regarding consociational elements. Another 
section is methodology, which emphasizes how the study was conducted and where 
relevant data was gathered from. The weaknesses of the study are also portrayed here. The 
analysis makes up another section in the structure of the thesis. Here the findings and 
conclusions resulting from the analysis will be expressed, as well as how such conclusions 
were reached. The final section is the conclusion which is a general summary of the thesis.  
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1.2 Background 
 
 BiH is a country characteristic of a plural society, and it was one of the more 
diverse of the six republics that made up Yugoslavia. The three main religions of BiH, 
Islam, Orthodoxy and Catholicism, are key determinants of one’s ethnicity, be it Bosniak, 
Serb or Croat. To clarify, most Bosniaks are Muslim, most Serbs are Orthodox Christians, 
and most Croatians are Catholic. The population of BiH is estimated to be at around 3.8 
million today, whereas in 1991 there were 4.3 million inhabitants. At the time of the 1991 
population census the Bosniaks made up 44% of the population, whereas the Serbs made up 
32% and the Croats 17%. 7% of the population comprise of 'others', which includes people 
identifying themselves as one of the following groups: Yugoslav, Jew, Roma, or Albanian. 
There are several other minority groups, as well. It is also expressed that the composition of 
the population is quite similar to that of what it was before the conflict erupted (Clancy, 
2007, p. 3; 47).  
 The people of the three diverse religious groups lived amongst each other for 
centuries and were not territorially divided on counts of religiosity. What is meant by this is 
that people of all backgrounds were dispersed across the region and no one area was 
exclusively inhabited by one group. Singleton (1985) portrays that the Serbs, Croats, and 
Bosniaks have the same background and are the same people: “once the South Slavs had 
settled in the Balkans they also became separated from each other, partly because of 
geographical obstacles, and partly because of the historical circumstances of foreign 
occupations” (p. 14). Nonetheless, the political deadlock, as well as the ethnic divisions and 
identities, are very much real. However, when putting religion aside, BiH seems to be 
characteristic of a homogenous nation. For instance, the same language is spoken (usually 
at the same time), similar food is cooked, same jokes are prevalent, procrastination is taken 
as a preeminent approach to life, the same Latin American and Turkish soaps are enjoyed, 
and there is great intolerance of draft (Loza and Pekmezovic 2012, p. 15). The point being, 
there are great similarities across the different ethnicities of BiH. These similarities are not 
being utilized much, but nevertheless, it is understandable as to why it is hard to strengthen 
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the ties. Hence, it still seems unlikely that ethnic affiliations will die out in years to come 
and a power-sharing system of some sort is necessary for the meantime.  
 Moreover, BiH became a recognized country on April 6
th
, 1992, as it declared its 
independence from Yugoslavia. Great controversy surrounded the country's bid for 
independence, though. The challenge was for the three major parties involved to come to a 
consensus on the country's future, but no such compromise could be reached. Similar issues 
still plague its political subsistence in the present, as did in the lead up to the war in '92. In 
BiH, at the moment, there is stability, but the country is well shy of prospering out of its 
dire situation.  
 During the most recent conflict, among other variables, the religious differences 
played a crucial role in separating the people. Each side was aiming to avoid minority 
status, and in 1992 the war in BiH erupts pinning the three groups against one another. 
Boyd argues the following: “war in Bosnia and Croatia was not the inevitable product of 
centuries of ethnic hatreds. It was created from ambition, fear, and incompetence-local and 
international” (Boyd, 1995, p. 26). In all the commotion ethnicity and religion became 
important as ordering devices (Mueller, 2000, p. 43). Group classification started to surface 
and the religious cleavages became more entrenched as the conflict unravelled. There was 
an “us and them” attitude. People were left with little choice and usually had to choose 
from either being dominated by vicious thugs belonging to their own ethnic group or by 
vicious thugs of a different ethnic group (Mueller, 2000, p. 56).  
 The conclusion to the violence was enforced by the signing of the DPA in 1995. 
However, the agreement did not really resolve the conflict in itself, but actually just froze it. 
The sentiments from the war still fuel the political stagnation of the country, and voting still 
happens predominantly along ethnic lines. Nevertheless, the DPA brought about the 
complex system of power sharing in place in BiH, and peace has thus far been maintained. 
Map 1, on the following page, depicts the territorial divisions envisioned by the DPA. In 
BiH there are two entities. One is the Republika Srpska (RS), the Serb Republic, and the 
other is the Federation of BiH (FBiH), the Bosniak-Croat dominated entity. Although the 
latter is internally divided into 10 cantons, the two entities have extensive autonomous 
powers. There is also Brcko District, which is an autonomous unit in the north-east part of 
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the country, and when observing the map below it is the region which splits the RS into two 
parts. It was established as its own district in 1999. It has its own laws, but international 
administration has been very direct in this district (Bieber, 2005, p. 422; 426).  
 
 
Map 1. Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
Source: http://www.saferworld.org.uk/where/bosnia-and-herzegovina 
 
 
 Moreover, the following is a description of a few political parties which is necessary 
for the understanding of the analysis section. The Serbian Radical Party "Dr. Vojislav 
Seselj" (SRS-VS) emerged following a disagreement among the members of the Serbian 
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Radical Party of Republika Srpska (SRS RS) in 2002 (Press RS, 2012). These two parties 
are also associated with the SRS based in Serbia. Hence, some Croatian and Serbian 
political parties in BiH are associated with political parties based in Croatia and Serbia. The 
SRS based in BiH has had links to the SRS in Serbia since around 1992 when the war 
broke out in BiH, and during the war the party was in contention with the Serbian 
Democratic Party (SDS) with regards to the Serbian cause (Caspersen, 2010, p. 33; 141; 
150). Moreover, the Croatian Democratic Union of BiH (HDZ BiH) and the Croatian 
Democratic Union 1990 (HDZ 1990) are Croat based parties in BiH. A division within the 
HDZ BiH resulted in the creation of the HDZ 1990 in 2006 due to prolonged disagreements 
over how the ministerial positions should be distributed (Goering, 2007, p. 173-174). They 
both have associations to the HDZ based in Croatia by name and through political support. 
One example being that in 2006 the Prime Minister of Croatia, also the leader of the 
Croatia based HDZ, publicly showed his support for the HDZ 1990 (OSCE, 2007, p. 10). 
The Croatian Party of Rights of BiH (HSP BiH) is another Croatian party in BiH which has 
associations with a political party in Croatia, which as well is called the HSP. The Party for 
Democratic Action (SDA) is a Bosniak nationalist party, which was a wartime party along 
with the SDS, SRS RS and HDZ BiH. Moreover, the SDP is the largest of the political 
parties in BiH with multi-ethnic appeal, and even though it operates in both entities, the 
majority of its support is attained from the urban areas of the FBiH. In addition, as the 
majority of its membership is made up of Bosniaks and because it sided with the SDA and 
another Bosniak party, the Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH), during constitutional 
talks in 2008, the SDP is regarded as a party that fends for Bosniak interests (Touquet, 
2011, p. 456; 459). The Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) is one more 
important party important to the analysis. It is a Serb dominated party which started to 
attain its significance in the government around 2002.  
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Section 2: Theoretical Framework 
 
2.1 Theory: Consociationalism 
 
 Consociational democracy is the concept that Arend Lijphart is credited with 
launching. The definition of such a concept is: "consociational democracy means 
government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture 
into a stable democracy" (Lijphart, 1969, p. 216). However, Lijphart does acknowledge that 
before him others have described what would be known as consociational democracy and 
that the term itself had been used in the past. Andeweg (2000) explains that it had been 
used by Apter (1961) some years earlier on the topic of Africa and authority patterns. Lewis 
(1965) and Ake (1967) are also credited to being predecessors of Lijphart's with their works 
on West Africa. Also, Andeweg mentions that Lehmbruch (1967) had analyzed the cases of 
Switzerland and Austria concerning the puzzle of stable democracy in divided societies 
shortly before Lijphart had, and referred to their circumstances using terms in German. 
Thus, there were others who described what later would be known as consociationalism 
(Andeweg, 2000, p. 510-511).  
 The significance of consociational democracy has to do with deviant cases of 
countries where there is coexistence of stable democracy and social segmentation. Lijphart 
explains that "when a society is divided by sharp cleavages with no or few overlapping 
memberships and loyalties - in other words, when the political culture is deeply fragmented 
- the pressures toward moderate middle-of-the-road attitudes are absent" (Lijphart 1969, p. 
211). So, according to the theory of cross cutting cleavages, the contention is that societies 
characterized by divided subcultures which are reinforced by mutual cleavages should be 
plagued by great immobility and instability (Lijphart, 1969, p. 211). Hence, social 
cleavages, at times, overlap and reinforce one another. An instance of such a circumstance 
would be the case if all religious citizens belonged to the working class and all secular 
citizens belonged to the upper or middle class (Andewg, 2000, p. 510). However, the 
opposite could occur as well where a church member, who is also part of a trade union, 
associates with secular working class individuals in particular situations, but also in his 
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church he makes connections with upper and middle class people (Andewg, 2000, p. 509). 
The latter sentence being an example of social cleavages cross-cutting each other. The 
"crosscutting cleavages" proposition contends that when people hold membership in 
various groups they are pulled in different directions and are exposed to others with diverse 
associations and allegiances. This leads to moderate political attitudes and reduces the 
intensity of political conflict (Lijphart, 1969, p. 208). 
 The classic cases which portray the coexistence of stable democracy and social 
segmentation are: the Low Countries, Switzerland, and Austria. Cases differ in the time 
frame of their classification as consociational democracies. The Netherlands was identified 
as one during the time period of 1917-1967, Austria from 1945 to1966, Belgium since 
1918, and Switzerland since 1943. Luxembourg has also been regarded as a consociational 
democracy, but little attention has been given to its status. Therefore, the initial contribution 
of consociationalism to democratic theory is that it explains such deviant cases where stable 
democracy and social segmentation do coexist (Andeweg, 2000, p. 510). The theory has 
also expanded to include countries beyond Western Europe. These cases beyond Western 
Europe include Lebanon during the time period of 1943 to 1975 and since 1989, Malaysia 
during the years of 1955-1969 and since 1971, Columbia from 1958 to 1974, and India 
from the time of their independence to the late 1960s. In addition, consociational aspects 
have been discovered in other countries, such as Canada and Israel. Other countries have 
even experimented with the consociational model, such as Cyprus and Czechoslovakia, 
albeit in brief (Andeweg, 2000, p. 513-514).  
 Furthermore, cross-pressures can be on both the elite and mass levels. The elite, 
most often, find it crucial to adopt moderate positions when heading social groups with 
overlapping and varying memberships (Lijphart, 1969, p. 208). Lijphart expresses the two 
main paths the elite can choose to take: "the leaders of the rival subcultures may engage in 
competitive behaviour and thus further aggravate mutual tensions and political instability, 
but they may also make deliberate efforts to counteract the immobilizing and unstabilizing 
effects of cultural fragmentation" (Lijphart, 1969, p. 211-212). In latter situation what 
happens is that the elite become aware of the dangers presented by the potential division 
into hostile subcultures and realize that the appropriate response to deal with the dangers is 
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the formation of a grand coalition. This intentional joint effort taken by the elites as a way 
to stabilize the system is the fundamental characteristic of consociational democracy 
(Lijphart, 1969, p. 213). Therefore, it has more to do with a grand coalition, or a cartel of 
elites making crucial decisions, than about any particular institutional arrangement 
(Lijphart, 1969, p. 215). This was evident in Belgium and Austria. In Austria's case, due to 
civil war tensions of the First Republic, the leaders from diverging Catholic and Socialist 
subcultures came to a consensus to unite in a grand coalition after the Second World War. 
At the time of the birth of independent Belgium there was an understanding between the 
Catholic and Liberal leaders for the need to avert catastrophic experiences of the Brabant 
Revolution of 1789, which left Belgium weak and divided leading to Habsburg reconquest 
(Lijphart, 1969, p. 212).  
 Moreover, as a result of decisions made by the cartel of elites, the structuring of 
institutionalized processes are prone to change, such as the electoral system. At times of 
elections passions may run high, but at the same time the desire at the elite level to avoid 
political competition may also be strong. Thus, in such an instance, consociational 
principles are applied to the electoral structure as a way to avert damage to the already 
created, and possibly fragile, system of cooperation. Here, however, the principle of 
majority rule is violated by consociational democracy, but even so, it does not stray greatly 
from normative democratic theory, as there is great emphasis on inclusiveness through 
power-sharing (Lijphart, 1969, p. 214). The majoritarian interpretation of democracy is 
government by majority where the majority governs while the minority opposes. 
Depending on how majority rule is achieved and put into practice violations of democracy 
can occur with ease, since principles of exclusion are articulated within such a system 
(Lijphart, 1999, p. 31). 
 Majoritarian democracy seems fine for predominantly homogenous societies where 
a present minority party could become a majority in future elections, and also in countries 
where the policies of political parties do not diverge extremely but actually stay within the 
proximity of the political center (Lijphart, 1999, p. 31). However, in fragmented systems or 
plural societies stakes tend to be much higher with regards to decision making even when 
concerning decisions outside constitutional importance (Lijphart, 1969, p. 214). These 
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plural societies are ones "that are sharply divided along religious, ideological, linguistic, 
cultural, ethnic, or racial lines into virtually subsocieties with their own political parties, 
interest groups, and media of communication" (Lijphart, 1999, p. 32). Thus, the majority 
rule system becomes both undemocratic and dangerous within societies characterized by 
such circumstances, since it is highly likely that the stability required for majoritarian 
democracy will be absent. Hence, the minorities cannot form majorities in plural societies 
because the parties diverge extremely and voters tend to be more rigid with their loyalties. 
In a lot of deeply fragmented societies the outcome of majority rule is not democracy but 
majority dictatorship and civil unrest (Lijphart, 1999, p. 32-33). Therefore, for plural 
societies, simple majority rule is not sufficient and more is required.  
 Lijphart (1977) outlines four characteristics essential for defining a consociational 
democracy. These four characteristics are: grand coalition, mutual veto, proportionality, 
and segmental autonomy. As established above a grand coalition signifies the primary 
characteristic of consociational democracy. Forming a grand coalition requires for potential 
participants to have a moderate attitude and be willing to make compromises. The country 
then is governed through the grand coalition which incorporates the political elite 
representative of all significant segments of the divided society. Lack of trust in deeply 
segmented societies is of vital concern, therefore, "by being in the government together, 
parties that do not quite trust each other have an important guarantee of political security" 
(Lijphart 1977, p. 25; 30-31). An example of a grand coalition is the Swiss seven-member 
federal executive body. This Federal Council is "composed of members of the four main 
parties in proportion to their electoral strengths: two Radicals, two Socialists, two 
Catholics, and one member of the Peasants' party. The seven councillors also represent the 
different languages and regions" (Lijphart, 1977, p. 31).  
 The other three characteristics, secondary instruments, of a consociational 
democracy compliment the grand coalition, and all four are closely related to each other. In 
grand coalitions, even though the minority is able to express its case, it can still be outvoted 
by the majority when decisions are being made. If vital interests are of concern during such 
decisions then cooperation can be endangered. A minority veto is then added to the grand 
coalition principle, as only a veto of such nature can guarantee complete political protection 
20 
 
for each segment (Lijphart, 1977, p. 36-37). The third characteristic, proportionality, serves 
two important functions. The first function consists of the distribution of civil service 
appointments and financial resources between the diverging segments. The second, but 
more important function, deals with the decision-making process. The proportional model 
holds that all groups have influence over a decision, but in proportion to their respective 
numerical strength in the population (Lijphart, 1977, p. 38-39). The final characteristic, 
segmental autonomy, entails minority rule: "rule by the minority over itself in the area of 
the minority's exclusive concern" (Lijphart, 1977, p. 41). Federalism is a special form of 
segmental autonomy, and both territorial and nonterritorial federalism have been important 
for the stability in European consociational democracies. They serve important functions as 
the granting of autonomy and overrepresentation for minorities in particular aspects of 
governance. (Lijphart, 1977, p. 41-43). Moreover, as Lijphart is the scholar who has most 
defended consociational theory, and to whom most critics have directed their criticisms, 
these four criteria have become the main defining features of the theory (Andeweg, 2000, p. 
512).  
 Along with the four characteristics for defining a consociational democracy there 
are several favourable conditions, or factors, for consociational democracy's development 
in segmented societies. Table 1 on the following page, extracted from Andeweg (2000), 
shows the favourable conditions Lijphart outlined for the development of consociational 
democracy in segmented societies, in certain works of his, over the stretch of many years. 
Andeweg (2000) points out how Lijphart was not clear-cut about whether the factors of 
degree of pluralism and cross-cutting cleavages fit as favourable conditions. Thus, there is a 
lack of clarity regarding some of the favourable conditions and their status (Andeweg, 
2000, p. 22). This can be seen as one of the weaknesses in the work. Nonetheless, in a later 
work the factor of cross-cutting cleavages was replaced by socioeconomic equality, and the 
latter Lijphart lists as the second most favourable condition (Lijphart, 1996, p. 263). 
Socioeconomic equality as a favourable condition implies "that it is helpful when the class 
cleavage cuts across whatever other cleavage is salient" (Andeweg, 2000, p. 521-522). 
Lijphart expresses this in his analysis of India where "socioeconomic differences within 
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religious and linguistic groups are so much larger that they overshadow intergroup 
disparities" (Lijphart, 1996, p. 263).  
 
 
Table 1: Favourable Conditions for Consociational Democracy 
Lijphart 
1969: 216-22 
Lijphart 
1977: 53-103 
Lijphart 
1985: 119-28 
1996: 262-63 
Multiple Balance of Power Multiple balance of power No majority segment 
External threat Multiparty system Segments of equal size 
Relatively low decision-
making load 
Small country Small number of segments 
Distinct lines of cleavage Degree of pluralism (?) External threat 
Length of time a consociational 
system has been in operation 
Cross-cutting cleavages (?) Small population 
Internal political cohesion of 
subcultures 
Segmental isolation and 
federalism 
Socioeconomic equality 
Adequate articulation of the 
interests of the subcultures 
Tradition of elite 
accommodation 
Geographical concentration of 
segments  
Widespread approval of the 
principle of government by 
elite cartel 
Representative party system Tradition of elite 
accommodation 
 Overarching loyalties Overarching loyalties 
"*Question marks indicate factors that Lijphart mentioned without definitely concluding that they 
are favourable conditions." 
Source: (Andeweg, 2000, p. 522).  
 
 
 However, the most important of such favourable conditions is the abscence of a 
majority segment, or near majority. Thus, it is a drawback to consociational power-sharing 
if, in divided societies, there is a group which represents a solid majority and vouches for 
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majority rule over consociationalism (Lijphart, 2007, p. 51). When subcultures are of 
roughly the same size the leaders cannot count on a clear majority, but if the situation 
resembled the opposite of such then the elite belonging to the majority group would not 
have any incentives to share power with the losing minority group(s) (Andeweg, 2000, p. 
524). Thus, segments of equal size becomes a favourable condition because a balance of 
power is established between the groups when they are of similar size. In addition, with 
regards to the favourable condition of small number of segments, Lijphart asserts that 
negotiations become too difficult and complex if too many groups are involved in the mix 
(Lijphart, 1996, p. 263). Similarily, his justification of small population as a favourable 
condition is based on his belief that "in small countries political leaders are more likely to 
know each other personally than in larger countries, the decision-making process is less 
complex, and such countries generally do not conduct a very active foreign policy" 
(Andeweg, 2000, p. 523; Lijphart, 1985, p. 123).  
 Another favourable condition is for the diverging segments to share in the same 
external threat, as internal unity is strengthened by external dangers. One more favourable 
condition for the development of consociatinal democracy is the geographical concentration 
of segments. Thus, "if groups are geogrphically concetrated, then federalism can be used to 
promote group autonomy" (Lijphart 1996, p. 263). Moreover, the presence of overarching 
loyalties in divided societies serve as a favourable factor as they work towards decreasing 
the strength of particularistic loyalties (Lijphart, 1996, p. 263). Religous bonds and 
nationalism are examples of overarching loyalties. In Belgium, for instance, the integrative 
power of Catholicism has been stronger than the class cleavage among practicing Catholics 
(Lijphart, 1977, p. 82). Tradition of elite accomodation makes up the last favourable factor 
to be covered. Certainly, consociationalism can be fostered more constructively if there are 
deep roots of consensus between the diverging groups (Lijphart, 1996, p. 263). Andeweg 
expresses that one criticism that is directed at this last factor covered is that the "traditon of 
elite predates the development of class and religious cleavages in Dutch society and that 
consociationalism therefore does not result from any self-denying prophecy" (Andeweg, 
2000, p. 523). However, a weakness of such a critique is also noted. Hence, with regards to 
Dutch society it is still not clear as to "why the leaders of the new emancipatory movements 
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of Protestants, Catholics, and the secular working class that came from the pillarized 
segments would adopt the ways of those they were trying to replace" (Andeweg, 2000, p. 
523).  
 Furthermore, as was mentioned above, some countries have tried experimenting 
with consociational democracy and its implementation has been advocated for others. The 
implementation of the four main characteristics of consociational democracy is proposed 
for deeply segmented societies as a path most likely to produce stability (Andeweg, 2000, 
p. 516; Lijphart, 1977, p. 223-238). Lijphart encourages leaders of plural societies to 
engage in consociational engineering in a way where they must become consociational 
engineers in order to establish and/or reinforce democratic institutions within their own 
countries, and democracy must be accepted as basic goal (Lijphart, 1977, p. 223). There is 
great debate over the application of the consociational model as a solution to conflict ridden 
divided societies, and the theory has been faced with much criticism. Some of the criticisms 
Lijphart (1977) himself raises about consociational democracy deal with the potentiality of 
failure in bringing about and maintaining political stability within such societies. One such 
criticism is that several of the consociational democratic characteristics may lead to an 
environment of indecisiveness and inefficiency. First, the concern is that decision-making 
is made slow through government by grand coalition. Second, "the mutual veto involves the 
further danger that decision-making may be completely immobilized" (Lijphart, 1977, p. 
50-51). Hence, it may produce stagnation and instability due to the active use of the veto. 
The third of such criticisms is that if the standard of recruitment is based on proportionality 
then this hinders the priority of individual merit, since, in such a circumstance, membership 
in a certain segment becomes more important. Finally, segmental autonomy requires much 
capital for its upkeep. For segmental autonomy to function there is a need for the 
"multiplication of the number of governmental and administrative units as well as the 
establishment of a large number of separate facilities for the different segments" (Lijphart, 
1977, p. 51).  
 Lijphart points out that, in the short run, the case might be such where 
consociational democracy tends to strengthen the plural character of a segmented society 
which reinforces separation between the diverging segments rather than aiding in the 
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process of integration (Lijphart, 1977, p. 228). Also, a consociational system may come 
across as slow and ponderous (Lijphart, 1977, p. 51). However, Lijphart has been consistent 
in defending the theory, and one point Lijphart brings up when responding to such 
criticisms and potential disadvantages is the distinction between short term and long term 
effectiveness of consociational democracy (Adeweg, 2000, p. 529). Hence, "an extended 
period of successful consociational government may be able to resolve some of the major 
disagreements among the segments and thus to depoliticize segmental divergences, and it 
may also create sufficient mutual trust at both elite and mass levels" (Lijphart, 1977, p. 
228). The sides showing hostility towards one another should be able to gain from the 
experiences of coming to a consensus on settling the crisis, or at least from making attempts 
to do so, as well as from reaching a level of mutual tolerance (Lijphart, 1977, p. 228).  
 Another criticism that is brought up is that of the failure of consociational Cyprus. 
This reflects on the weaknesses of claiming consociational engineering as a necessary or 
sufficient method for achieving stable democracy. In addition, Lebanon and Malaysia 
represent two cases of reasonable success with consociational democracy in the Third 
World, but in the end they were unsuccessful. Thus, there are doubts about the feasibility of 
consociational democracy outside the realm of the Western world (Lijphart, 1977, p. 225). 
However, for cases such as Lebanon, Lijphart contends that it is a choice between 
consociational democracy or no democracy, rather than one between consociational and 
majoritarian democracy (Lijphart, 1985, p. 13). This may be a dilemma which many more 
countries are faced with. Therefore, "consociationalism has expanded from an amendment 
to democratic theory intended to help explain the existence of democratic stability in a few 
small European countries, to a normative theory of consociational engineering in practically 
all deeply divided countries" (Andeweg, 2000, p. 517).  
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2.2 Integrative Approach 
 
 The integrative model is another approach for regulating divided societies. This 
approach has been most advocated by Donald Horowitz, and is an alternative to the system 
advanced by Lijphart. Thus, instead of separating the ethnic groups into their own spheres 
and guaranteeing each group representation it emphasizes an electoral system which binds 
the diverging groups and brings to the forefront issues which are common to, and 
important, for all of the sides involved. In divided societies where ethnic issues are 
prevalent what is necessary is to dedicate attention to providing incentives for 
accommodative behaviour. The electoral system is central for this approach since the 
incentives for politicians are likely to be found within it. Also, politicians may be more 
inclined to compromise under some electoral systems than others, which further signifies 
the importance of the electoral system to be implemented (Horowitz, 2002, p. 23-24). The 
point is to encourage the development of parties with broad platforms that will appeal to the 
citizenry belonging to all the different groups. When the political system is organized in 
such a way where political parties have to attract and be dependent on the votes of all the 
diverse groups, and not just one, then progress towards transcending ethnic divisions is 
made. The emphasis is to make moderation rewarding (Horowitz, 1990, p. 452).  
 Horowitz (1990) alludes to the case in Malaysia of how a society which is divided 
can make a shift towards moderation by making arrangements which make politicians rely 
on votes from citizens outside of their own group. Malaysia, most importantly, is organized 
in such a way where there are several heterogeneous municipalities, and this has been the 
main reason influencing the emergence of an exchange of votes across ethnic lines 
(Horowitz, 1990, p. 471-472). Horowitz (1991) terms this practice of exchanging of votes 
across ethnic lines as 'vote pooling', which will be discussed below. Nonetheless, the 
importance of highly heterogeneous municipalities is that even the party representative of 
the largest group has to take into account that there is a significant number of people in said 
constituency which should be accounted for, as they can highly influence the vote. On the 
other hand, in municipalities which are homogenous, and the minorities only comprise a 
small percentage of the constituency, then the party, or parties, representative of the largest 
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group, even if they are moderate on ethnic issues, do not have anything to gain from the 
minority group's votes. In the case of Malaysia, the Chinese minority could help undermine 
the Malaysian extremists by supporting more moderate parties. In addition, in the 
municipalities where the Chinese population was outnumbered by the Malays the Chinese-
based political party could urge its supporters to vote for more moderate Malay parties, and 
vice versa (Horowitz, 1990, p. 464-465). This then made it possible for parties 
representative of Malays and non-Malays to come together in a coalition to challenge the 
ruling coalition and accuse it of "selling out the rights of the Malays and the rights of the 
non-Malays" (Horowitz, 1990, p. 467).  
 The integrative approach acknowledges that that identities are flexible, and 
criticizes the consociational approach for neglecting this. Since group identities can change, 
issues other than ones concerning ethnicity can then become the more important ones 
(Horowitz, 2002, p. 24-25). Therefore, it is possible to minimize the gap in the divisions 
between the conflicting groups and to regulate divided societies without further 
encouraging separation. Thus, federalism in a country characterized by a divided society 
should be organized around heterogeneous units. Horowitz does acknowledge, though, that 
both homogenous and heterogeneous units are not useful in all circumstances (Horowitz, 
1985, p. 617-618). However, Horowitz does claim that "heterogeneous states with the 
greatest potential for reducing conflict are those whose groups are intermixed or whose 
territorial boundaries have some long-standing binding force" (Horowitz, 1985, p. 619). In 
addition, if there are several heterogeneous units then there is a more likely chance that 
issues over resources and influence which can be attained at the center will not be defined 
by ethnic interests. Horowitz also advises that if states are comprised of heterogeneous 
units that the center be more powerful. It is hard to assess how many of such units is best 
for a federal system to be comprised of in order to reduce conflict, but it is perhaps better to 
have more units instead of fewer (Horowitz, 1985, p. 620-621). On this point Horowitz 
exclaims:  
The more states there are, the greater will be the tendency of ethnic and subethnic 
groups to be concerned with parochial alignments and issues, and the greater will 
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be their difficulty of combining across state lines to make coherent and divisive 
claims at the center. (Horowitz, 1985, p. 621) 
 It is noted that the directions of the institutions, like political parties and politicians, 
need to be pointed towards focusing on generating incentives for moderation and multi-
ethnicity. Thus, a preferential electoral system is advanced for the purpose of having the 
party or candidate be dependent on votes from the electorate outside of their own ethnic 
group. Here the voters not only convey their support for their first choice candidate, which 
is likely from a party representative of their own ethnicity, but also to choices of secondary 
preference, which would be for candidates representing other ethnic groups (Ellis, 2006, p. 
3-4). One variety of preferential voting which Horowitz prescribes is alternative voting, and 
it "is a system in which second and subsequent preferences of those voters whose first 
preference is not one of the top two candidates are reallocated until a candidate attains a 
majority" (Horowitz, 1991, p. 188). It favours candidates who are able to attain a majority 
of the votes, rather than a plurality. What Horowitz terms as 'vote pooling' depends on such 
an electoral system. Vote pooling is where two parties agree on an exchange in electoral 
support, and Horowitz refers to it as happening across ethnic or racial lines (Horowitz, 
1991, p. 166-167). If this type of practice takes hold on the grounds that an agreement 
between parties is reached then it can be established that a foundation for interethnic policy 
compromise has been laid. Hence, "voters of one group could provide the margin of victory 
for a candidate of another group, who might then be responsive to their concerns" 
(Horowitz, 1991, p. 173). In deeply segmented societies elections in systems characterised 
by alternative voting will often rely on second and third preferences where a majority 
threshold needs to be achieved for victory. The parties which are rewarded, then, are those 
which negotiate across party lines for second and third preferences. Therefore, "the 
exchange of second and third preferences, based on reciprocal concessions on ethnic issues, 
is likely to lead to an accommodative interethnic coalition if no party can form a 
government alone" (Horowitz, 1991, p. 189).  
 The main criticism of the integrative approach is that it does not differ much from a 
majority-rule system of democracy, and, thus, it does not guarantee minority representation, 
which is ultimately necessary in divided societies. Horowitz's alternative voting is similar 
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to the method known as the majority run-off. The difference being that in alternative voting 
results are reached in one round, whereas when the majority run-off method is used it takes 
two ballots as there is an elimination round. In Western Europe the majority run-off method 
was widely used, but proportional representation replaced it in the beginning of the 20
th
 
century. There was dissatisfaction with its function in societies divided along linguistic and 
religious lines. It also lacked in extending representation to the minorities (Lijphart 2002, p. 
47-48). Similarly, Reynolds (2000) categorizes Horowitz's approach as belonging to the 
majoritarian family. Reyonlds explains this to be the reason not only because "the 
alternative vote produces classically majoritarian results, and because presidencies (even 
with supermajority election rules) are essentially winner-take-all institutions, but because 
integrative majoritariansim seeks to include minorities by proxy rather than by full 
appearance" (Reynolds, 2000, p. 159). It is added that within Horowitz's approach there is 
nothing outlined which ensures that political power will be shared amongst the minority 
and majority groups (Reynolds, 2000, p. 159). On this point Lijphart expresses that it is 
difficult to imagine that a minority group would be willing to agree to a system where there 
is not much chance of being represented by a leader from their own ethnic group, and at the 
same time succumb to being represented by leaders of the larger groups who have more 
moderate agendas (2002, p. 49-50).  
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Section 3: Literature Review 
 
3.1 Governance in BiH 
 
 The general question revolving around Caspersen's study, and one which she begins 
with is: "which institutions are most effective in fostering stability following an ethnic 
war?" (Caspersen, 2004, p. 569). What Caspersen set out to do is assess which of the 
approaches was more effective in fostering stability, either the consociational or integrative. 
Since the DPA contains traits of both the integrative and consociational approaches, BiH, 
for Caspersen, provides a good case study for the comparison of the two approaches to 
conflict regulation. In addition, both of these approaches are relevant for conflict-ridden 
and deeply segmented societies, as they are the two most recommended models for 
regulating conflict (Caspersen, 2004, p. 570).  
 The comparison of the consociational and integrative models was conducted 
through the use of election results, examination of political elite behaviour, and a 
comparison of the performance of consociational and integrative institutions. Her analysis 
was largely guided and based on the contentions pertaining to the two models regarding 
voting patterns, political elite behaviour, and workings of institutions. In addition, 
Caspersen's study consists of two phases. The first phase is during the time between 1996-
97 and the second between the years of 1998-2002. The 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002 
elections are used to map the support for nationalist political parties, and then the 1997 and 
2000 municipal elections are used to compare heterogeneous and homogenous 
municipalities (Caspersen, 2004, p. 574-575). Political elite behaviour is examined through 
an analysis with compliance to power-sharing arrangements, the willingness to engage in 
interethnic cooperation, and coalition building. For Caspersen the behaviour of the political 
elite is the basis of stability in the two models. Then for the workings of the institutions she 
focused on the human rights institutions, the Constitutional Court, the Central Bank, and 
the Parliament. The former three represent integrative institutions and the latter represents a 
consociational institution. In addition, pertaining to the analysis of integrative elements, 
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responses to refugee returns and responses to the implementation of more integrative 
measures are reflected upon. 
 Caspersen noted, in general, that there was a decline in the support for nationalist 
parties, and that these results indicated a moderation in public attitudes. In addition, 
nationalist support was actually slightly higher in the FBiH compared to the RS in the 
1996, 1998, and 2002 elections (Caspersen, 2004, p. 575-576). In addition, the cooperation 
between the elites was not very high at the time of the particular elections she observed. 
First, "no inter-ethnic alliances between significant parties were formed before the 
elections" (Caspersen, 2004, p. 579). Also, in the second phase of her study there was an 
increase in the effectiveness of both consociational and integrative institutions (Caspersen, 
2004, 581). Moreover, she concludes that the consociational model has been better in 
fostering stability due to the ongoing deep divisions, but also that an implementation of 
both of the approaches at the same time can promote moderation. It was also stressed that 
there was an increase on the emphasis of the integrative measures within the DPA, and that 
new measures were being introduced (Caspersen, 2004, p. 570; 573).  
 For the rest of this section on the literature review only a select few sources are 
relied upon. It may seem limiting but these are the most relevant sources on the topic of 
consociationalism and BiH. They touch upon many of the aspects of the four main 
characteristics and favourable conditions of consociational democracy. Thus, the 
governance of BiH is well covered within these sources. One of the main purposes here is 
to try and describe the different consociational features in BiH and how power is divided 
among the different groups, and also to portray where discrepancies lie compared to the 
criteria outlined by Lijphart in order to show that there is room for improvement regarding 
the consociational elements. In addition, the sources provide a good overview of the lack of 
consensus between the diverging groups on a structure of governance.  
 A consociational democratic settlement is very evident in the DPA. For instance, 
Belloni (2004) describes the post-Dayton institutional framework as being "a 'classic 
example of consociational settlement' where institutions correspond to an ideal-typical 
consociational democracy" (p. 336). It has been a gruelling task in managing such a 
complex system and making it work, but that is quite expected considering the experience 
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of war. In addition, between the three sides there are many concerns and preferences which 
differ (2004, p. 335).  
 The DPA set out to guarantee the political representation of each national group at 
the institutional level, to protect the groups' rights to self-government, and to promote inter-
ethnic accommodation and compromise. In order to balance the different views held by the 
political parties representing the three groups the DPA is largely based on the "elaborate set 
of checks and balances...grounded in the theory of consociationalism" (Belloni, 2004, p. 
336). Furthermore, proportionality is evident in the electoral system of BiH as political 
representation is guaranteed for the three main groups. In addition, in all governmental 
levels group representation is guaranteed through ethnic quotas. Also, the right to veto 
decisions infringing upon one's own 'vital interests' was granted to each group (Belloni, 
2004, p. 336). With regards to ethnic autonomy being an important consociational feature, 
Caspersen (2004) adds that ethnic autonomy is, to a large extent, the defining feature of the 
structure in BiH. The segmental autonomy aspect of consociationalism pertains to the two 
entities, RS and FBiH. However, the division of autonomous powers within BiH also 
resembles the integrative model. The autonomy given to the two entities is not based on 
ethnicity itself, but on ethnicity and territory. Thus, there is potential for generating greater 
residential heterogeneity, and thus undermining the ethnic autonomous arrangement of the 
consociational structure in BiH (Caspersen, 2004, p. 573). Nonetheless, further 
consociational elements of the DPA are found in the three-person Presidency; Council of 
Ministers; and the Parliamentary Assembly (House of Representatives and House of 
Peoples). In these institutions one finds a grand coalition, minority veto provisions and 
parity of representation (Caspersen, 2004, p. 573).  
 In BiH, the principle of proportionality and parity pertains to all the fundamental 
political institutions of the state. First, this principle is evident in the first chamber of the 
Parliamentary Assembly, the House of Representatives, since the Federation is responsible 
for assigning two thirds of its members, and then the other third are to come from the RS. 
This principle of proportionality and parity based on entity and ethnic orientation is further 
found in the House of Peoples. The House of Peoples is composed of fifteen members: five 
Serbs, five Bosniaks and five Croats. The Serb portion is elected by the National Assembly 
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of the RS, and the members representing the other two segments are elected by the House 
of Peoples of the Federal Parliament. In each of the Houses of the Parliamentary Assembly 
the presidency consists of one Serb, one Bosniak and one Croat. Another institution is the 
national government, which is known as the Council of Ministers, where only two thirds of 
the ministers are allowed to be from the Federation and not more. In addition, the 
Presidency appoints the Chair of the Council, and they in turn select the ministers and their 
deputies pertaining to all constituent peoples (Kasapovic, 2005, p. 4-5). What resulted out 
of such constitutional provisions is a "normative framework for the formation of a kind of 
grand coalition governments i.e. governments consisting of the parties of all three national 
segments" was created (Kasapovic, 2005, p. 5).  
 Kasapovic (2005) goes over several DPA provisions in her analysis of BiH of which 
some will be depicted here. In both of the Houses of the Parliamentary Assembly the 
decisions of great importance are to be reached by consensus or qualified majorities by 
those present and voting. It is further stated in the DPA that "the Delegates and Members 
shall make their best efforts to see that the majority includes at least one-third of the votes 
of Delegates or Members from the territory of each Entity" (Dayton, 1995, Article IV). As 
legislation needs to pass through both houses in order to be adopted it is important that the 
sides come to a consensus in every stage of the process of adopting a legislation. However, 
since the veto being exercised in the Parliamentary Assembly is an entity-veto, the Croats 
and Bosniaks cannot exercise the veto on their own since they share the entity of the FBiH, 
meanwhile the Serbs are entitled to a super-veto in this process, as their entity is greatly 
homogenous. The veto voting procedure here can be improved, though, to just be based on 
ethnicity instead of combining a territorial veto with an ethnic veto (Bahtic-Kunrath, 2011, 
p. 902; 912-913). It seems as though if the Croats would be provided with their own veto 
measures in the Parliamentary Assembly then each side will have equal access to a veto.  
 Furthermore, in the Presidency the decisions are made by consensus as well, and 
here each side is entitled to a veto. Nonetheless, in instances where all efforts in reaching a 
consensus fail then decisions can be adopted by two of the three members. In such 
circumstances, though, the mutual-veto aspect of consociational democracy comes into 
effect because the one member who is in disagreement with said decision can declare it a 
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destruction of a vital interest of the entity they had been elected from (Dayton, 1995, 
Article IV). In the DPA the following is laid out:  
Such a Decision shall be referred immediately to the National Assembly of the 
Republika Srpska, if the declaration was made by the Member from that territory; 
to the Bosniac Delegates of the House of Peoples of the Federation, if the 
declaration was made by the Bosniac Member; or to the Croat Delegates of that 
body, if the declaration was made by the Croat Member. If the declaration is 
confirmed by a two thirds vote of those persons within ten days of the referral, 
the challenged Presidency Decision shall not take effect. (Dayton, 1995, Annex 
4)  
 Thus, from the arrangements covered above, it should be noted that BiH shares 
many characteristics regarding the four main elements of consociational democracy: grand 
coalition, mutual veto, proportionality, and segmental autonomy. Concerning grand 
coalition, since each group is guaranteed representation in almost all aspects of governance, 
it is very likely that the government will be made up of parties of all three national 
segments (Kasapovic, 2005, p. 5). In addition, in many instances veto provisions are 
available for use when vital interests regarding a particular group are of concern. Also, all 
constituent groups have guaranteed representation in politics, and each group has influence 
over the decision making process. However, the power-sharing structure in BiH is 
exclusionary for the smaller minorities as they are barred from taking part in elections for 
high office. (Bieber, 1999, p. 85). In addition, other minority groups are not equipped with 
rights to a veto. Furthermore, autonomy outlined in the DPA does signify segmental 
autonomy to an extent. However, the Croats do not have their own entity, which is deemed 
a drawback.  
 Moreover, in BiH there are some favourable conditions, outlined by Lijphart, that fit 
and others that do not. Kasapovic (2005) gives an evaluation of consociationalism's 
favourable and unfavourable factors. It is noted that there are several conditions present in 
the society of BiH which allow for the establishment of consociational democracy. These 
characteristics include: the small population factor; the presence of three distinct religious 
and national segments which the society is divided along; society being structured in such a 
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way where no segmental group represents a majority; the segmental groups are to a great 
extent geographically concentrated (Kasapovic, 2005 p. 9). The factor in terms of 
population, to an extent, points in Bosnia's favour. Hence, "consociational systems tend to 
be more successful in small countries, since they are easier to govern and possess less 
complex decision-making structures" (Bieber, 1999, p. 84). It can also be added that the 
segments are relatively of equal size, though, the Croats are relatively less populous than 
the other two groups. Nonetheless, the Croats still have the status as a constituent peoples 
and are able to compete reasonably well with the other groups within the current system.  
 Another favourable condition present within BiH is socioeconomic equality. In BiH 
the economic situation is relatively poor for the average person regardless of their ethnicity. 
The unemployment rate in 2011 in BiH was at 27.6%. When focusing just on the entities 
the unemployment rate does not tend to differ greatly. In the RS the unemployment rate 
was 24.5% and 29.2% in the FBiH. In addititon, 48% of the population of BiH live below 
the poverty line and 18% are in the critical category (Stankovic, 2012, p. 3). Woehrel 
(2013) discusses how many opinion polls in BiH show "a broad disgust with the Bosnian 
political class, due in part to the petty squabbling..., while the country continues to suffer 
serious problems with unemployment and poverty" (p. 5). In one such poll only 12% of 
respondents stated that their lives had improved over the past four years (Woehrel, 2013, p. 
5). Therefore, the relatively poor socioeconomic situation affects all three groups.  
 There are, of course, also conditions of unfavourable nature. First, for Kasapovic 
(2005), the biggest obstacle to this structure's efficiency is the lack of consensus on a 
common political system (p. 9). In addition, BiH is plagued by a weak tradition of 
democratic consociationalism along with the presence of radical nationalisms (Kasapovic, 
2005, p. 8). Thus, in the present-day situation, traditions of accommodation are lacking. 
Another unfavourable condition in BiH is the absence of overarching loyalties. In many 
countries nationalism is one such overarching loyalty and can be a unifying force, as 
mentioned by Lijphart in his assessment of India (Lijphart, 1996, p. 263). However, in the 
case of BiH there are multiple nationalisms present, which works against the point of being 
a unifying force. Also taking into consideration that there is a weakness of other cleavages 
which would cut across these national lines then no cohesion is attained (Bieber, 1999, p. 
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84). Another unfavourable condition in BiH is the absence of an external threat. For 
Lijphart, the danger of external threats may actually have a unifying effect for small 
countries. However, this is not the case in BiH, as the external threat factor actually aids in 
the divisions between the segmental groups rather than in unifying them (Bieber, 1999, p. 
84). Hence, in BiH the threats posed by external actors were only ever faced by one or two 
of the main segments in BiH, and thus, this only further deepened the divisions within the 
society (Kasapovic, 2005, p. 9).  
 Therefore, it can be concluded that BiH rates moderately on 6 of the 9 favourable 
conditions. In addition, even though the power-sharing system in BiH has much to improve 
on, the structure in BiH still displays elements from the four main characteristics of 
consociational democracy. A power-sharing system then may suffice in the long run in such 
an environment. This conclusion is based off of Lijphart's analysis on India and his 
contention that India rates favourably on seven out of the nine criteria and that it would be 
more surprising if India had not incorporated a power-sharing system (Lijphart, 1996, p. 
264).  
 Furthermore, Bieber (1999) examines the applicability of the consociational 
democratic model to BiH by comparing it to the case of Belgium, which he takes as a role 
model case of a plural democracy. Bieber mentions that, according to Lijphart, Belgium is 
stable because "the Flemish/Walloon division is supplemented by other cleavages, such as 
the spiritual families and the Bruxellesois" (Bieber, 1999, p. 84). In BiH's case, though, the 
unfavourable factor of external threats, and also the lack of other cleavages cutting across 
national lines signify that "the demographic starting point for Bosnia is less favourable for 
the establishment of a consensus democracy than in Belgium" (Bieber, 1999, p. 84).  
 What seems to be at the root of the problem is that in BiH there is a large absence of 
non-national cleavages. In Belgium, first came the development of the trans-communal 
parties and then the different communities were accommodated. This is the main difference 
since in BiH nationality was the primary criteria for which defined the traditional parties, 
and now it is difficult to make attempts in crossing ethnic lines and in directing policy 
towards multi-nationals especially because of the experience of war. The development of a 
successful pluralist party system in BiH requires more effort from parties to cut across 
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national cleavages. Confrontation only tends to increase in a one-level system, as is the case 
in BiH with purely national divisions (Bieber, 1999, p. 87). The recommendation, then, is 
that, in BiH, "the parties have to develop programmes which focus less on national 
differences and rather on alternative approaches to the economy, social affairs, education 
and other matters" (Bieber, 1999, p. 94).  
 Moreover, the main problem, expressed by Belloni (2004), is that, in BiH, 
consociationalism has had limited success in bringing about long-term cooperation and 
compromise between the diverging ethnicities (Belloni, 2004, p. 336). He goes onto 
describe the situation in BiH as one where the "ethnic quotas reinforced the salience of 
ethnic identity and cleavages, entrenched many of the ethnic divisions that international 
intervention was supposed to soften and eventually overcome, and risked perpetuating 
instability" (Belloni, 2004, p. 337). Furthermore, there is an absence of incentives for 
cooperation, and politicians running on ethnic platforms are successful. Reconciliation has 
not been promoted and there has been constant tension between the three main groups 
making the decision-making process difficult (Belloni, 2004, p. 337-338). Overall, the 
system has been inefficient in instigating much progress. These particular points of 
Belloni's strongly tie into one of the criticisms Lijphart himself mentioned, which was that 
in the short run consociational democracy tends to strengthen the segmental divergences in 
a plural society. However, it is also the case that over an extensive period of successful 
consociational governance the main disagreements among the segments can be quelled and 
resolved (Lijphart, 1977, p. 228). What constitutes an extensive period or long-term should 
be questioned concerning Belloni's criticism. It should be noted that at the time when 
Belloni's article was published a decade had not passed since the signing of the DPA, and 
even today it seems to be quite too early to assess consociationalism in terms of 'long-term' 
effects, since consociational democracy has not had that much time to develop in post-
Dayton BiH.  
 Complications in the system have also arisen due to rifts between the mediating 
efforts of the international community and local politicians. The Organization for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) attempted to moderate the voting process for the 
Federation House of Peoples by making members rely on votes from those not of their own 
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community. Representatives were previously elected by their own national groups from 
cantonal assemblies, but when the Barry Rule was introduced Bosniaks and Croats from the 
cantonal assemblies could vote for representatives not of their national group. In the 
Federation House of Peoples there are 30 seats reserved for Croats, 30 seats for Bosniaks 
and 20 seats for others, which includes Jews, Roma, and other minorities. When the Barry 
Rule took effect the main nationalist Croat party, the HDZ BiH, protested because in the 
cantonal assemblies Bosniaks outnumber the Croats. As a result, the Bosniaks would have 
great influence in the choosing of representatives from the smaller groups. This 
experimental change resulted in the dismissal of the Croat leader and the Barry Rule was 
dropped (Belloni, 2004, p. 344). Caspersen (2004) also makes reference to the Barry rule 
when assessing the responses to integrative measures, and with this particular case the 
integrative measure was largely rejected.  
 A similar style of voting is also in place for the process in electing candidates for 
the collective presidency. The Serb candidate is elected by voters from Republika Srpska, 
while the Croat and Bosniak candidates are elected by voters from the Federation (Karic, 
2012, p. 73-74). In this case ethnicity does not matter as long as the voter is voting for a 
candidate from the same entity he/she is registered in. Thus, the Croats are once again 
concerned about candidate positions which have been established to ensure their 
representation be influenced by Bosniak votes. The Croat dissatisfaction with this 
integrative measure will further be discussed in the analysis of political elite behaviour.  
 Regarding the issue of consensus on a common political system, in 2011 the three 
sides were presented with proposals from Western actors, and all initial suggestions were 
rejected. As a result of the difficulty or reluctance to come to agreeable terms, a question is 
raised in "whether the preservation of a multinational state is feasible in a situation where 
the majority of its citizens belonging to two of the three constituent communities of that 
state only reluctantly acknowledge its legitimacy?" (Berg and Solvak, 2011, p. 462). An 
account of what each side seek for will now be given. The Bosniak elite are not in favour of 
the current structure of the state. At the dawn of independence they envisaged a unitary 
civic state for the country (Kasapovic, 2005, p. 11). Presently, most Bosniaks bid for the 
replacement of the DPA with a more centralized constitution, and subsequently their 
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support for nation and civic state building would see the abolishment of the RS (Berg and 
Solvak, 2011, p. 461). However, on the other hand, the Croats saw independent BiH as 
more of a federation or a confederation made up of its national groups. Thus, a fallout 
between the Croats and Bosniaks during the early stages of the war signified a withdrawal 
of the Croatian consent expressed in the 1992 referendum on BiH's independence. 
Consequently for the Bosniaks, the majority vote which was established in this referendum 
in favour of the state's establishment was lost, and, at this point, "the Bosniacs became a 
minority, both from the civic and national aspect" (Kasapovic, 2005, p. 11-12). Moreover, 
the Croats do not have the benefit of having their own entity or the institutional protection 
that is associated with it. The feeling is that their position is always being undermined 
within BiH (Caspersen, 2004, p. 576).  
 Regarding the majority of the Serb population of BiH the act of engaging in 
Bosnian state-building is not prevalent. In a 2004 survey it was shown that "45% of the 
population of RS accepted Bosnia as their own country, while 43% did not"(Berg and 
Solvak, 2011, p. 461). In addition, in BiH, the patterns of identification differ between the 
two entities. In a survey conducted by Berg and Solvak (2011) is illustrated that about 58% 
of the respondents from the RS identified with their own entity in BiH, while only 13% 
showed allegiance to the state of BiH. In addition, only about 25% of respondents from RS 
"gave a solid agreement of being known as 'Bosnian people', while 78.9% of FBiH 
residents seemed not to be troubled by this" (Berg and Solvak, 2011, p. 468-469). In 
addition, evaluations of regime performance based on satisfaction levels with the political 
regime, government, economy, education and health services shows that discontent is much 
higher in the FBiH than in RS. Therefore, the status of RS being practically a state within a 
state is something the majority of Serbs in RS are determined to preserve (Berg and Solvak, 
2011, p. 474-475). The differences in opinion and interest amongst the diverging groups is 
very evident in the conduct within the political party system, as when in 2006, prior to the 
general elections, the SBiH and the SNSD were explicit with regards to nationalistic 
rhetoric. The SBiH is in favour of the centralization of BiH and calls for the abolishment of 
the RS, whereas the SNSD works towards the preservation of the status of the RS. Thus, for 
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every call for the abolishment of the RS met with a threat to hold a referendum for the 
secession of the RS from BiH (Goering, 2007, p. 171).  
 Tracking back to the comparison with Belgium, one way to improve the system in 
BiH is through a focus on the aspects of autonomy. In Belgium there is a long tradition of 
cultural autonomy and long before territorial autonomy was implemented cultural 
autonomy had been used as a conflict-solving tool. Since cultural autonomy is not based on 
territory it can offer rights to groups that happen to be spread out in isolated pockets and are 
otherwise not likely to achieve territorial autonomy. In addition, in areas that are more 
multiethnic cultural autonomy aids in the accommodation of communities, such as in 
Brussels. In the DPA cultural autonomy is neglected, and for the people who constitute a 
minority in particular regions are at a great disadvantage (Bieber, 1999, p. 91-92).  
 In Stroschein (2003) the importance of non-territorial autonomy for BiH is also 
stressed, and the potentiality of advocating this aspect of autonomy for BiH is examined. 
Once again, the analysis is based off of the Belgian case. Rarely is it the case that defined 
territories are demographically homogenous, and in these cases where minorities are more 
likely to be misrepresented and neglected is where non-territorial autonomy can possibly be 
of use. This form of autonomy is not based on geographic principle, but it still allows for 
minority groups to have self-administration over matters on culture, language, ethnicity and 
religion (Stroschein, 2003, p. 10). In Belgium the territorial units of Flanders, Wallonia and 
Brussels have jurisdiction over affairs that concern their respective territory, for instance 
over policies on the economy and transportation. On the other hand, the non-territorial 
units, based on the three linguistic communities (Francophones, the Flemings and 
Germans), make decisions on educational and linguistic matters (Stroschein, 2003, p. 12). 
In Belgium, "because the Francophone and Flemish communities are founded on a 
personal, rather than a geographic, principle, they can therefore administer linguistic and 
educational matters for their respective populations within the Brussels region without 
dividing up its territory" (Stroschein, 2003, p. 13). At first the influence of the Flemish and 
French communities outside of their own territories was limited to just Brussels, but after 
an agreement in 2001 the Fracophone community attained extended powers within the 
Flanders region over matters concerning the French-speaking community, and in Brussels 
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the Flemings gained increased representation in the council (Stroschein, 2003, p. 13). 
Furthermore, an example of how non-territorial autonomy can be utilized in BiH is: if 
within a specific canton there are not enough Serbs to elect a cantonal representative they 
will be left without a voice in the FBiH, but if there was an implementation of a non-
territorial unit the problem could be addressed more effectively. Hence, non-territorial units 
give a voice to isolated minorities where they can be easily overrun by the majority 
(Stroschein, 2003, p. 19-20).  
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Section 4: Methodology 
 
4.1 Methodology 
 
 The argument pursued in this thesis is that the political environment in BiH is fit for 
consociational elements, and instead of deviating away from the use of consociational 
elements there should be an encouragement to improve them. The study is largely a follow 
up on the conclusions which Caspersen reached regarding the trends on the political 
environment of BiH through the use of the methods pertaining to voting patterns, political 
elite behaviour and workings of the institutions. Thus, the aim of a current study is to assess 
how the trends in the political environment in BiH have fared since Caspersen's study in 
order to reach recommendations on whether or not to support consociational elements and 
their improvement in BiH. The research questions are: how have these trends, regarding the 
political environment, based on the contentions of the consociational and integrative 
models, fared since the study was last conducted and what can this tell us about the 
prospects of the further utilization of consociational elements in the power-sharing system 
of BiH? The questions will be explored through the contentions pertaining to each of the 
models. Hence, pursuing the contentions pertaining to the two models about voting 
patterns, political elite behaviour, and workings of institutions will give insight on the 
political environment in BiH and if it is fit for consociational democracy.  
 The methods and how they are used in this study will now be portrayed. As 
Caspersen did, the gathering of data is done through an assessment of election results, 
observations of coalition building and compliance with power-sharing arrangements by 
politicians, and the workings of the Parliament. The first part of the analysis will consist of 
mapping out the voting patterns in order to assess, in general, the support for nationalist 
political parties, and also to see in which municipalities voting for more nationalist political 
parties occurs. The question being raised is: "do the extreme nationalist parties have more 
support in ethnically homogenous or heterogeneous municipalities?" (Caspersen, 2004, p. 
574). This question is raised because the consociational model argues that heterogeneous 
units will foster greater extremism, while the integrative model believes the opposite to be 
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true (i.e., moderation and inter-ethnic cooperation will be fostered in heterogeneous units) 
(Caspersen, 2004, p. 574). Mapping out the support for nationalist political parties will 
provide us with insight on which of the two seems to be the trend in BiH presently. Thus, if 
the consociational contention holds true then it strengthens the case that the environment is 
fit for consociational elements.  
 However, foremost, it is necessary to establish which political parties are to be 
labelled as nationalist. The labelling of a political party as nationalist is analyzed through 
party history, rhetoric, association, and, in general, seeing if there is appeal for the inclusion 
of all groups of the plural society, or if the party appeal is exclusionary. The political 
parties which Caspersen used were: SDA, SDS, SRS RS, and HDZ BiH. The SDA, SDS, 
SRS and HDZ were the wartime parties and are labelled as more nationalist since they have 
been the least willing to cooperate and accept inter-ethnic accommodation (Caspersen, 
2004, p. 574). In this current study the following political parties will also be added 
towards calculating for the nationalist voting share: SNSD, HDZ 1990, SRS-VS, Croatian 
Christian Democratic Union (HKDU), and the Croat 'Demochristians' (HD). Thus, why 
these political parties are also labelled as nationalist will be further covered in the analysis 
section of the thesis. In addition, in whichever municipalities these parties identified as 
nationalist happen to be in a coalition with other parties it is still coded as a vote for 
nationalist support.  
 In this study the 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012 elections are used to gauge the 
support for the nationalist voting share, and then the municipal elections of 2004, 2008 and 
2012 are used to compare heterogeneous and homogenous municipalities. Election results 
are found on the Central Election Commission's website (www.izbori.ba). Thus, the study 
will be over the period of 2004-2012. Since Caspersen's study was published in 2004, the 
2004 elections were not covered. The 2004 elections then marks the start period of the 
study and the 2012 elections, the most recent ones, mark the end period of the study. 
However, the latest news reports from 2013 for political elite behaviour are also made use 
of.  
 The last part for the analysis of voting patterns is to distinguish between the 
heterogeneous and homogenous municipalities. Caspersen notes that a population census 
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would have been used to identify the municipalities as either heterogeneous or 
homogenous, but at the time of her study the last census was conducted in 1991 and this 
still happens to be the case today. The 1991 census cannot be used as it does not reflect the 
postwar circumstances regarding ethnic compositions of the municipalities, and with no up-
to-date census there is a need to estimate the composition of the municipalities. Thus, the 
voting patterns themselves were used to identify the municipalities. Hence, voting in BiH 
happens predominantly along ethnic lines, and since most political parties are nationalist 
orientated a calculation of the voting shares can be used to estimate the composition of a 
municipality (Caspersen, 2004, p. 577; 586). The label the several parties are assigned will 
be used to gauge the ethnicities which comprise particular municipalities. She defined 
heterogeneous municipalities as those in which the largest ethnic group makes up less than 
66% of the voting share (Caspersen, 2004, p. 577). The same procedure to identify 
heterogeneous municipalities is used in this study. The label a political party is given will 
consist of the ethnic group they represent. Even the more moderate parties are identified 
with representing a particular ethnic group when assessing whether or not a municipality is 
heterogeneous.  
 The second part of the analysis consists of the political elite behaviour. Political 
elite behaviour is assessed through their willingness and ability to engage in inter-ethnic 
cooperation. Political elite behaviour is indicated by the level of compliance with power-
sharing arrangements and whether or not there was acceptance or rejection of their 
requirements. Caspersen used an OSCE report on BiH, which was observed and referenced 
by a secondary source, in order to observe the compliance with power-sharing 
arrangements. In this current study OSCE reports are also used for the observation of 
political elite behaviour, but so too are reports from Freedom House and the International 
Crisis Group, OHR statements, news reports, and journal articles. A OSCE report covering 
the 2012 elections has not been published and for the 2008 elections only an assessment 
prior to the elections was published, thus there is a reliance on sources other than the 
OSCE. As no integrative institutions are assessed in this study, the contention of the 
consociational model pertaining to integrative institutions is assessed in this section of the 
analysis. In this study the consociational contention that integrative institutions will not be 
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welcomed and will face difficulties in getting established is extended to include integrative 
measures in general, as is also the case in Caspersen's study (Caspersen, 2004, p. 575). 
Another contention which is observed in this part of the analysis is the one pertaining to the 
integrative model where it foresees that in heterogeneous municipalities elected politicians 
will show an ability to engage in inter-ethnic cooperation. The case studies concerning 
political elite behaviour which will be depicted and which will be used to assess the 
contentions just mentioned above are: controversy over the Srebrenica election law, 
deadlock in Mostar electoral procedures, controversy over ministerial positions following 
the 2010 general elections, and elections in multi-ethnic Brcko district. Throughout the 
period between 2004-2012 these cases make up the instances of reluctance to comply with 
power-sharing arrangements.  
 Another indicator for political elite behaviour is the observation of the attempts in 
coalition building with parties representative of other ethnic groups. With regards to 
consociational elements, when assessing political elite behaviour, what is to be focused on 
is how the elite from diverging groups cooperate with one another, as the theory of 
consociationalism states that the political leaders from diverging groups will come together 
in order to avoid dangers posed by a society divided along hostile subcultures, however, 
that is when they become aware of such dangers (Lijphart, 1969, p. 211-212). Nonetheless, 
coalitions were attempted and formed at the time of the 2006 and 2010 general elections, 
and also due to complications of forming a government another coalition was formed in 
2012. Thus, these are the coalitions which are assessed.  
 The final part of the analysis which will be conducted in this study deals with the 
workings of the Parliament. For an assessment of the consociational institutions Caspersen 
focused on the Parliament and the levels of agreement on legislation. Likewise, in this 
section of the analysis only the Parliament will be examined. In addition, the integrative 
model's contention that the consociational institutions will be faced by ineffectiveness and 
deadlock will be assessed in this section of the analysis. Taken into consideration here is 
the level of agreement on legislation, and subsequently the amount of laws passed. A study 
has already been conducted analysing the Parliament for the period of 2006-2010. Thus, the 
findings from Bahtic-Kunrath (2011) will be extracted and analyzed. In addition, a more 
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recent analysis on the Parliament stemming from 2010 will also be completed. Any laws 
since 2010 which have been passed or rejected can be found on the Parliamentary 
Assembly's web page (https://www.parlament.ba/). The focus will be on how many laws 
were passed each year and to emphasize those of more importance. There are some laws 
which are more important than others, such as those which concern EU integration. If there 
is an increase in the amount of laws passed from year to year and if there is consensus on 
laws of importance then it can be said that the consociational institution is improving. 
However, if the trends show otherwise and favour the contention pertaining to the 
integrative model then it weakens the case for further utilization of consociational elements 
in BiH.  
 One weakness of this study is that the workings of integrative institutions along 
with responses to refugee returns are not assessed. Thus, this study does not track the trends 
covered in Caspersen's study in full. It may very well be the case that by covering these 
aspects of integrative elements the study would produce a better perspective on the debate 
between the two approaches and on changes in the balance between the two approaches in 
BiH. Nevertheless, this study still ensures that all contentions pertaining to the two models 
are analyzed. Even though in this study integrative institutions are not analyzed, integrative 
measures are. As mentioned above the consociational contention that integrative 
institutions will not be accepted and their establishment will face difficulties is analyzed in 
the analysis section dedicated to political elite behaviour, as electoral procedures 
resembling those advocated by the integrative apprach are depicted in the case studies 
portrayed there.  
 Another weakness is the missing up-to-date population census, but, as has been 
pointed out above, the 1991 census is the most recent one and is not useful for this study as 
the composition of many municipalities has changed since that year. The estimating method 
from Caspersen's study to identify municipalities as either heterogeneous or homogenous 
will thus be used. It is still valid as a case can be made for that voting still happens along 
ethnic lines. The up-to-date census was scheduled for April of 2013, but has been 
postponed to October of 2013. One more aspect which should be cleared up here is: why it 
is important to assess voting patterns when it is already known that voting happens along 
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ethnic lines? The reason it is still important to evaluate is to see in which municipalities the 
voting is more moderate leaning and in which it is nationalist leaning. This is the case 
because if nationalist voting is more predominant in heterogeneous units then this is an 
indication of a further need for consociational elements in power-sharing, however, if the 
opposite proves to be the trend then it is an indication that such units could be ready for a 
more integrative approach.  
 One other weakness is that only one consociational institution is used to assess the 
workings of consociational institutions (i.e., the Parliament). Two other quite significant 
consociational institutions in BiH are the three-person Presidency and the Council of 
Ministers. It is quite difficult, though, to formulate how to measure the effectiveness of 
these two other consociational institutions. Nonetheless, Caspersen herself only focused on 
the Parliament and its functions to assess the workings of consociational institutions and 
her study produced noteworthy conclusions. Also, by doing an analysis on the Parliament 
and the legislative processes, the provisions on the veto for the vital national interests are 
also examined, which are an essential part of consociational power-sharing.  
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Section 5: Analysis 
 
5.1 Voting Patterns 
 
 The first order of analysis is to track for the trend concerning voting patterns for the 
share in nationalist party support across all five elections since, and including, the 2004 
elections, and also for the heterogeneous and homogenous municipalities through the 
analysis of the 2004, 2008 and 2012 municipal elections. Consistent with Caspersen (2004), 
the wartime political parties are used towards the nationalist voting share, which, once 
again, are: SDA, HDZ, SDS and SRS. Other political parties of BiH which count towards 
the nationalist voting share are: SNSD, SRS-VS, HDZ 1990, HKDU, HD, and the HSP 
BiH. Even though most of the nationalist support was still attained by the wartime parties, 
the exception being the SNSD, it is still important to mention these other political parties 
which were used in this study towards the nationalist voting share but not in Caspersen's. 
The SNSD is especially noteworthy because they have overtaken the SDS as the 
predominant political party in the RS. The HDZ 1990 and the HSP BiH, though are not the 
biggest of the parties, still garnered an okay amount of support, but the rest of these smaller 
parties were only significant in a particular few municipalities.  
 First, the parties which had the words radical were identified as extreme and 
nationalist. In addition, the parties whose names expressed non-secularism (i.e., advocating 
a particular religion) were also identified as extreme and nationalist. The SRS-VS, as its 
name suggests, is one of the Serbian radical parties, the other being the wartime SRS RS. 
Both of these parties are active in BiH, but mainly in the RS. The SRS in Serbia is led by 
Vojislav Seselj. Thus, the reference to Vojislav Seselj by the SRS-VS also contributes to as 
to why the support for this party counted towards the nationalist voting share. Furthermore, 
the parties whose names expressed non-secularism are the HKDU and HD and therefore the 
support for them contributed towards the nationalist voting share. Both political parties 
refer to associating with being Croatian and Christian, and since Croatians are 
predominantly Catholic one can assume it is exclusionary to other faiths and to even other 
nationalities of BiH.  
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 The support for HDZ 1990 was coded as support towards the nationalist voting 
share, since the split within the HDZ of BiH was not due to reasons of ideology, as it was 
due to disputes over ministerial positions (Goering, 2007, p. 173-174). The HSP BiH was 
mentioned by Caspersen as a nationalist party, but at the time of her study the support for 
this party was negligible and was not included for the nationalist voting share (Caspersen, 
2004, p. 586). In this current study, though, the support for the HSP BiH is coded as 
nationalist. Its ideals are tracked back to Ante Starcevic, as referred to on their web page, 
who was one of the founders of the HSP (Povijest, 2011). However, Ante Starcevic is also 
referred to as the ""father" of pure Croatian nationalism" (Ognyanova, 2000, p. 8), thus the 
support for the HSP BiH is coded as nationalist. The final party to be listed as a nationalist 
political party is the Serb dominated SNSD. It is led by the political figure Milorad Dodik 
who is also the president of the RS. However when this party was emerging it was 
identified as being moderate by the international community and praised as a party which 
could overtake the dominance of the radical SDS (Eralp, 2012, p. 21). In addition, in 2000 
Dodik was described by Madeline Albright as a "champion of the international community" 
(Bjelajac, 2012). This explains as to why the SNSD was not identified as a nationalist 
political party in Caspersen's study. However, since then the political rhetoric of the SNSD 
has changed drastically. The SNSD has been suspended from the Socialist International for 
reasons of nationalism and its extremist positions (Bieber, 2011). Also, this new political 
rhetoric utilized by Dodik and the SNSD has even been regarded as more nationalist than 
that of the SDS politicians (Eralp, 2012, p. 21).  
 Further on, in order to distinguish between the heterogeneous and homogenous 
municipalities it is required to identify the political parties attaining votes in particular 
municipalities as being representative of one of the ethnic groups. For the nationalist parties 
it is quite clear as to which ethnic group they represent, but other parties not identified as 
nationalist had to be associated with a particular ethnic group as well, such as the SBiH and 
the SDP, along with many others. Nevertheless, Caspersen, in her study mentioned that the 
SDP, though, has multi-ethnic appeal, "its appeal beyond Bosniac voters is assessed to be 
limited, and it was therefore coded as Bosniak" (Caspersen, 2004, p. 586). The case can 
similarly be made today as well, as was alluded to in the section describing the political 
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parties. Another political party which is worth noting is the SBiH, which was alluded to 
being moderate by Caspersen (2004, p. 586), and was coded as moderate and Bosniak in 
this current study.  
 The findings regarding voting patterns will now be addressed along with a 
comparison to those of Caspersen's study. Caspersen concluded, in general, that there was a 
decline in the support for nationalist parties, and that these results indicated a moderation in 
public attitudes. In both the RS and FBiH votes for nationalist support were marked slightly 
below 50% in the 2000 and 2002 elections. In addition, nationalist support was actually 
slightly higher in the FBiH compared to the RS in the 1996, 1998, and 2002 elections 
(Caspersen, 2004, p. 575-576). However, at the outset of this current study there was 
curiosity as to see if such trends continued since the 2002 elections, especially concerning 
the RS.  
 The election results from 2004 to 2012 in Figure 1, on the next page, show that the 
nationalist voting share for the whole country of BiH is on average above the 50% mark or 
placed right on it for each election assessed. Also, the nationalist voting share tends to be 
noticeably higher in the RS compared to the FBiH. The most significant occurrence to be 
noted is the decline in the nationalist support in the 2010 general elections for the FBiH. 
This is explained by the tremendous success the SDP garnered for these particular elections 
which diverted support away, it seems, from mainly the SDA. Hence, the SDA obtained its 
worst results in its political history during these elections (Karic, 2012, p. 83). This 
signifies a hint that the Bosniak electorate was becoming more moderate in its approach, 
however, in the following elections there is almost a full reversal of this trend as nationalist 
support in the FBiH nearly recovers back to its 2008 level. Besides this, in the 2010 
elections there is a recorded increase for nationalist support in the RS, and also interesting 
is the decrease in support for nationalist parties in the RS for the 2012 elections, meanwhile 
an increase is recorded for the FBiH for the same elections, as just was mentioned. So 
another indication to be made is that it seems that the support for nationalist parties within 
the two entities varies and for the most part is not in unison. The support for nationalist 
political parties fluctuates from election to election and thus it is not convincing that public 
attitudes are shifting towards moderation as Caspersen concluded. In addition, the voting 
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share for nationalist support is still higher than that of which was recorded by Caspersen 
(2004) for the elections in 2000 and 2002.  
 
 
Figure 1. Nationalist Party Support in BiH 
 
Source: Official election results from http://www.izbori.ba/ 
 
 
 Furthermore, with regards to the municipal elections and the trends concerning 
heterogeneous and homogenous municipalities Caspersen (2004) concluded that in 
electorally heterogeneous municipalities it was found that the nationalist vote was higher 
than in homogenous municipalities, and this was the case in both of the phases of her study. 
In the 1997 elections 31 municipalities out of 135 were identified as electorally 
heterogeneous and in 2000 12 of 146 were labelled as such. In the 1997 municipal elections 
the average nationalist voting share for the heterogeneous municipalities was 85%, while in 
the homogenous municipalities for the same elections it was 73%. Then for the municipal 
elections in 2000 the average nationalist voting share for the heterogeneous municipalities 
was 62%, while in the homogenous elections it was 51%. Therefore, Caspersen (2004) 
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concluded that in electorally heterogeneous municipalities it was found that the nationalist 
vote was higher than in homogenous municipalities in both of the phases of her study. She 
further added that since there was a significant decrease in nationalist support in 
heterogeneous municipalities it may indicate that moderation may develop faster in 
residentially heterogeneous areas (Caspersen, 2004, p. 577). Still, though, there was also a 
significant decrease for the homogenous municipalities in her findings as well.  
 Nevertheless, in Table 2 below the results of this current study can be found. Table 
2 portrays the trends for the average nationalist voting share for heterogeneous and 
homogenous municipalities for the municipal elections of 2004, 2008 and 2012. Like in 
Caspersen's findings, the case is still one where the nationalist voting share is higher in 
heterogeneous municipalities than in homogenous ones. However, there are no real 
significant shifts from election to election to be noted from the findings shown in Table 2 
concerning nationalist party support, as the support only shifts by one percentage point to a 
few percentage points. Nonetheless, in the 2004 elections the average nationalist voting 
share is 68% for heterogeneous municipalities, whereas it is 58% for the homogenous ones. 
Then in the 2008 elections the average nationalist voting share is 71% for heterogeneous 
municipalities and 59% for homogenous ones. Finally, for the 2012 elections the average 
nationalist voting share is 67% for heterogeneous municipalities compared with 54% for 
homogenous ones. Thus, there is a marginal decrease in nationalist voting share for both the 
heterogeneous and homogenous municipalities from the 2004 to the 2012 elections, but the 
averages are still higher than those recorded by Caspersen for the 2000 elections. The 
trends are very much similar for both heterogeneous and homogenous municipalities over 
the course of these elections. For both of the municipal categories there was a slight 
increase in the nationalist voting share in 2004 compared to the 2000 findings by Caspersen 
(2004), then an increase again is recorded for the both of them in the 2008 elections 
compared to the previous ones, and finally a decrease is noted for the both of them in the 
2012 elections in comparison to the 2008 elections. These results show that the moderation 
is not quite developing faster in heterogeneous municipalities, as Caspersen (2004) alluded 
may happen.  
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Table 2. Nationalist Voting Share in Heterogeneous and Homogenous Municipalities 
Year Heterogeneous Homogenous 
2004 68% (19) 58% (122) 
2008 71% (15) 59% (127) 
2012 67% (17) 54% (124) 
Number of municipalities shown in the brackets 
Nationalist Voting Share as Average (%) 
Source: Official election results from http://www.izbori.ba/ 
 
 
 The main purpose of assessing these municipal elections since Caspersen's study 
was in order to pan out in which municipalities voting for more nationalist political parties 
occurs. The dilemma is that the consociational model argues that heterogeneous units will 
foster greater extremism, while the integrative model believes the opposite to be true (i.e., 
moderation and inter-ethnic cooperation will be fostered in heterogeneous units) 
(Caspersen, 2004, p. 574). The answer to the question of where extreme nationalist political 
parties have more support in, heterogeneous or homogenous municipalities, is that they 
have more support in heterogeneous municipalities. The findings are more in line with the 
contentions of the consociational model. Therefore, since the nationalist voting share is still 
higher in heterogeneous municipalities than in homogenous ones, and because the finding 
do not suggest a change in this trend, then the implication is that the political environment 
in BiH is more fit for consociational elements.  
 Moreover, one interesting finding is that there were several instances where parties 
representing the same ethnic group formed coalitions in particular municipalities where 
their group was marginalized. For instance, in the 2008 elections this phenomenon was 
noted in at least 13 homogenous municipalities. The aim of such an act seems to be to attain 
as much representation as possible in said municipalities for their own group for the 
intention of defending the group's status. This indicates that political parties are still 
national in their approach, and this applies for even those parties which were not identified 
as nationalist. The support for such coalitions and parties further suggests that the electorate 
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are still more inclined to vie for the sole interest of their own group rather than engage in 
mending the differences by giving their support to platforms of multi-ethnic appeal. 
 Here provided are a few clarifications regarding Table 2. 141 municipalities were 
recorded for the 2004 elections, 142 for the 2008 elections and 141 for the 2012 elections. 
In the 2004 elections data was missing for the municipality of Zvornik. There were 
suspicions of election rigging in Zvornik and repeat elections were held (OSCE, 2005, p. 
21). Voting eventually did take place for this municipality in 2004, however, election 
results were not to be found for Zvornik in the files provided by the Central Election 
Commission of BiH. Thus 141 municipalities are recorded for the 2004 municipal 
elections. In 2012 voting did not take place in the municipality of Mostar, which explains 
as to why 141 municipalities are recorded for that year. Also, there is fluctuation in the 
number of heterogeneous municipalities coded, but it is minimal, and can be attributed to a 
few different reasons. The threshold for identifying a municipality is 66%, so if the largest 
ethnic group makes up less than 66% of the voting share the municipality was coded as 
heterogeneous. For some municipalities the voting share of the largest group was close to 
the threshold. Thus, if enough people of the largest ethnic group moved away or returned to 
particular municipally it could have swayed the voting share, and/or simply that the voter 
turnout for the largest ethnic group increased or decreased thus influencing their voting 
share.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
54 
 
5.2 Political Elite Behaviour 
 
 Mostar portrays a case of a heterogeneous municipality that is in a political 
deadlock. The 2012 municipal elections were not held in Mostar as there were 
disagreements over the electoral law and potential changes, and thus the municipality as a 
whole did not meet the requirements necessary to hold elections. The political situation 
regarding the electoral process was not always this tense in Mostar. In 2004 the elections 
were held under new provisions where the city of Mostar was unified. A proportional 
system was utilized which managed for minimum and maximum representation for the 
three constituent peoples and others. In addition, the mayor was elected indirectly. This 
special electoral system ensured a political balance between the diverging groups (OSCE, 
2005, p. 3; 6). It is a complex system, though. The six districts of the city vary greatly in 
the size of their population, but even so the same amount of councillors are elected from 
each district. Also, it is clear that one constituent people in Mostar are more populous than 
the others. Thus, "the substantially differing weight, or value, of each citizen's vote 
contravenes commitments regarding the equality of the vote" (OSCE, 2005, p. 6). In 
Mostar, then, the system generates circumstances of disproportionate representation. 
Nonetheless, this system seemed to have been generally accepted in 2004 by the principal 
political parties (OSCE, 2005, p. 6). In addition, in Mostar the 2008 elections were once 
again to be held under a special procedure along the same guidelines to those used in 2004 
(OSCE, 2008, p. 5).  
 However, now, for the 2012 elections the issue of disproportionate representation 
has been raised and there is a need to reform the electoral law. The issue is that the 
Bosniaks are outnumbered electorally by the Croats. It is noted that Croats have 12,000 
more voters, and there is fear of being outvoted (Alic, 2012). This number is only an 
estimate since no population census has been conducted since 1991. The two largest 
political parties of Mostar are the HDZ and the SDA, and these two sides have not been 
able to come to an agreement as of yet. At the end of January of 2013 a meeting was called 
by the OHR to discuss the issue but representatives of the SDA did not attend, as they 
claim that the proposals which they have suggested have not been respected in earlier 
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meetings. In short, the SDA would like a system where Mostar would be organized in such 
a way where Bosniaks would have the same influence as the Croats, but the HDZ support a 
system where Mostar is organized as a single municipality and in which the weight of the 
vote is equal (Jukic, 2013).  
 In Srebrenica there were also special provisions in place for the municipal elections 
in 2008, but then changes were implemented for the 2012 elections. Prior to the 2012 
elections citizens which were residents of Srebrenica in 1991 but lived elsewhere could still 
participate in the municipal elections in Srebrenica if they chose not to vote in their current 
place of residency (OSCE, 2008, p. 4). These specific registration rules for Srebrenica 
favoured the Bosniak community there, which before the war represented a majority, but 
now after the war it is estimated that they are the minority group and the Serbs the majority. 
The mayor in Srebrenica has always been a Bosniak since the war ended, and this 
consistency has been influenced by the electoral law (Huseinovic and Arbutina, 2012). 
Therefore, the Bosniak elite were against a change in the electoral law. On the other hand, 
Srebrenica is part of the RS entity, and thus the political elite of the RS were opposed to the 
earlier electoral system, and brought up the point that the electoral law should not be any 
different in Srebrenica compared to other municipalities. In addition, the political parties 
representing the Serbian populous banded together to support one candidate for mayor 
(Ristic, 2012). Also, when changes to the electoral law were announced the political elite 
and the parties representative of the Bosniaks came to together to support their own 
candidate, and the mayor elected was once again a Bosniak (Jukic, 2012b).  
 The Brcko Distrct is one more case of a heterogeneous unit, which is plagued by 
electoral troubles and ethnic divisions. After both the 2004 and 2008 municipal elections it 
took many months to form a government in Brcko. In this same report it is mentioned that 
similar difficulties await Brcko in the 2012 elections (International Crisis Group, 2011, p. 
3). The year of 2011 was most troubling for Brcko, as it was hit hard by corruption. The 
International Supervisor for Brcko, Roderick Moore, described the situation as "perhaps the 
worst political crisis in the District since its establishment" (OHR, 2011). For nine months 
in that year Brcko was consumed by a crisis involving the mayor who was reluctant to 
comply with a ruling demanding his resignation. The government and assembly were 
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stalled to a great extent, as there was no consensus between the SNSD, HDZ, and SDP, the 
main political parties of Brcko, over the removal of the then mayor. The mayor was from 
the SNSD and was replaced by another member from the SNSD at the time of his eventual 
resignation. However, after this nine month debacle an anti-corruption campaign was led 
against the mayor who resigned and against other officials (International Crisis Group, 
2011, p. 4-5). Moreover, the development of multiethnic schools, neighbourhoods, and 
institutions has been praised by the international community. In addition, the international 
community's confidence in the capacity of the local institutions was enough, it seems, to 
make a crucial decision in suspending Supervision in the district (OHR, 2012).  
 The controversy over ministerial positions following the 2010 general elections 
portrays a case of lack of inter-ethnic cooperation beyond the municipal level. This 
controversy affected the stability of governance in the FBiH and in the whole of BiH, as no 
central government was formed for about a 14 month period following the 2010 general 
elections (Freedom House, 2012). One aspect of this crisis is very much a repeat of the 
Barry Rule instance which was alluded to in the literature review section. Thus, the 
particular integrative measure in the election process of the Croat presidency seat is highly 
rejected by the Croats. In the 2006 and 2010 general elections Komsic of the SDP was 
elected for this position, but in Croat dominated regions of the FBiH the majority of the 
votes went to the HDZ candidate. The criticism then is that Komsic got elected on behalf of 
mainly Bosniak votes, and the majority of Croats do not perceive him as a representative of 
theirs (Karic, 2012, p. 80-81). Another aspect of the crisis was the dilemma over the 
approval of the new cabinet in the FBiH, which was challenged by the HDZ and the HDZ 
1990. Key cabinet positions were of concern, but finally after about 14 months the HDZ 
was permitted to nominate candidates for the three of the four contested positions (Freedom 
House, 2012).  
 Caspersen concluded that the cooperation between the elites was not very high at 
the time of the particular elections she observed. First, "no inter-ethnic alliances between 
significant parties were formed before the elections" (Caspersen, 2004, p. 579). When 
observing coalition building for the elections since Caspersen's study a similar conclusion 
is reached. For this current study it too was found that no significant inter-ethnic coalitions 
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were formed prior the elections, and coalitions formed after the elections were not very 
functional. Following the 2006 general elections the coalition which formed the central 
government was not an effective one, mainly due to the lack of cooperation between the 
SNSD and SBiH (Goering, 2007, p. 173). The coalition which formed the government 14 
months after the 2010 elections did comprise of parties from all three ethnicities, but it had 
to be rearranged in late 2012 due to disputes. The SDA is now left out, but the current 
ruling coalition is also comprised of parties representative of all three ethnic groups, as it 
consists of the SDS, SNSD, HDZ, HDZ 1990, SDP and the Union for a Better Future 
(SBB) (Jukic, 2012a). The SDP and the SBB being the parties representative of the Bosniak 
community.  
 Consociationalism states that the political leaders from diverging groups will come 
together in order to avoid dangers posed by a society divided along hostile subcultures, that 
is when they become aware of such dangers (Lijphart, 1969, p. 211-212). The analysis of 
coalition building portrays that this development is not occurring in BiH. However, this 
current ruling coalition is noteworthy because a new deal has been struck on a process for 
reforming aspects of the governance in BiH, work towards having legislation to be more in 
line with the EU, and to work out a solution so that institutional equality includes all 
peoples of the citizenry (B92, 2012). Thus, this could be an implication of the phenomenon 
professed by the consociational model starting to be realized in BiH. Though, this depends 
on how the terms of the deal develop until the next elections, and if anything actually gets 
done, as the reporting on the developments of this deal have been minimum since it was 
first announced.  
 Moreover, Caspersen, for the 2000 elections, gathered that there were no instances 
of failures in complying with power-sharing arrangements. Nonetheless, Caspersen also 
concluded that while cooperation was more widespread during the later part of the second 
phase of her study, "the incentives for mono-ethnic appeals were still stronger than 
incentives for multi-ethnicity" (Caspersen, 2004, p. 579-580). After the assessment of the 
case studies above and the voting patterns a similar conclusion is reached in this study in 
that opting for multi-ethnicity is not a priority right now. In the time frame of this study the 
only discrepancies with power-sharing arrangements which were found were analyzed 
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above in the four case studies. At first this low number of case studies may seem as not 
being significant, especially considering that there are 142 municipalities. However, the 
combination of these instances of discrepancies were considerable enough to greatly impact 
the stability of governance and the potential progress that could have been made, 
particularly if the duration of some of the conflicts is taken into account.  
 Furthermore, the main point being concluded concerning political elite behaviour is 
that the integrative measures were not welcomed. The consociational model's contention 
holds true here that integrative measures will not be welcomed and will face difficulties in 
getting established. In addition, the integrative model foresees that in heterogeneous units 
elected politicians will show willingness and ability to engage in inter-ethnic cooperation 
(Caspersen, 2004, p. 574). However, all the cases which had issues with power-sharing 
arrangements were heterogeneous ones. These findings once again suggest that the political 
environment is fit for consociational elements. In Mostar there is a choice between either 
the simple majority system, integrative in its nature, where the two principal parties 
compete on an equal basis ensuring one will have more influence than the other, or a 
system more consociational in its nature where each side is guaranteed equal 
representation. In this situation, the majority system is being outright rejected, whereas the 
other worked for the previous two municipal elections. Most likely Mostar should have an 
electoral law in line with the rest of the municipalities, but it is still clear that there is 
difficulty in accepting the integrative measure. Nobody enjoys having minority status and 
the fear of being outvoted, and that is why the Bosniak elite are advocating for a 
consociational solution for Mostar, even though, interestingly enough, these very same elite 
are more in favour of an integrative system on the national level. The case in Srebenica was 
once again the fear of being outvoted. The Serbian and the Bosniak elite resorted to mono-
ethnic appeals to garner as much representation. Even with the electoral law changes the 
community which was most worried by the change still attained success. Therefore, as is 
evident, it is still very much rewarding for parties to unite along national lines, and the 
diverging sides still vie for the option of seeking for group interests and group protection.  
 Brcko displays a mixture of the two models to conflict regulation with regards to its 
governing and electoral system. Although there are obstructions from election to election, 
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Brcko, up until recently, was regarded as one of the more successful cases of post-conflict 
development in BiH. Hence, often it had been observed that members from rival parties 
would cooperate while in the rest of BiH this conduct was scarce (International Crisis 
Group, 2011, p. 2). In addition, seeing as the international supervision of Brcko has been 
suspended and with no discrepancies recorded for the 2012 municipal elections, Brcko now 
has a chance to regain this earlier trait of being regarded as a type of success story in BiH. 
The suspension of international supervision is a very crucial development for Brcko. 
Whereas in Mostar international intervention is regarded as the only viable option left 
(Alic, 2012), in Brcko there is a move away from it. Despite the many problems still faced 
by the society there, this can be interpreted as a positive development as the Supervisor and 
his team will not intervene in Brcko's affairs, leaving the governance up to the local 
population and its officials (OHR, 2012). Therefore, with the case of Brcko it can be said 
that a mix of the approaches has the ability to promote stability. In some instances then, as 
Caspersen also examined, the two approaches are not incompatible (Caspersen, 2004, p. 
570).  
 Finally, for the controversy concerning ministerial positions the resolution reached 
took much time, and in the end the problem concerning the process of electing the President 
for the Croat seat was not dealt with. Avoiding a repeat of such a crisis in the future is not 
quite ensured. The lack of satisfaction has enticed Croat calls for more autonomy. Hence, 
an NGO, Croatia Libertas, has sent draft changes to the constitution of BiH to the US 
Embassy in Sarajevo demanding for the establishment of Herzeg-Bosnia, the would-be 
Croat entity (B92, 2013). This particular Croat cause has support, from at least some of the 
caucus from the RS, as Dodik, in an interview, stated that BiH as a country has a future 
only if it realizes a third, Croat entity (Vecernji list, 2012). The trend seems to be that when 
integrative measures are advocated or pursued the side that feels disadvantaged responds 
abruptly, as is the case with the Croats in the FBiH, and as was the case in 2006 with the 
quarrel between the SBiH and the SNSD platforms when the calls for the abolition of the 
RS were met with threats of holding an independence referendum. The trend applies 
similarly to the Bosniaks in Mostar, and to a lesser degree in Srebrenica.  
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5.3 Consociational Institution (Parliament) 
 
 The analysis of the Parliament of BiH, regarded as a consociational institution, can 
further help make the case to further utilize consociational elements in BiH, that is if the 
findings show that there have been improvements in its effectiveness since Caspersen's 
study. Caspersen (2004) concluded that there was improvement for the consociational 
institution in the second phase of her study. Hence, between 1998-2000 an average of 5 
laws were passed per year, but then during the period between February 2001 and August 
2002 close to 40 laws were passed. She emphasizes that new laws of importance were also 
passed. Also, moderate political parties along with the more nationalist ones were recorded 
as being willing to cooperate in passing laws of importance (Caspersen, 2004, p. 580-581).  
 In Bahtic-Kunrath (2011) trends for the Parliament were tracked for the term 
between 2006 and 2010. For this term it was depicted that only about 30% of all planned 
legislation was adopted, while the rest either failed to make it to the Parliament, or did not 
make it through the legislation process. In the end 168 laws were recorded as being passed 
during this term (Bahtic-Kunrath, 2011, p. 900; 908). In this study it was thus concluded 
that the procedure for legislating the necessary reforms for the European Partnership is 
largely undermined. This was due to the prevalence of ethnic interests and the presence of 
strong veto players, with the caucus from the RS obstructing the process more often than 
those from the FBiH (Bahtic-Kunrath, 2011, p. 909; 911-912; 914). With such conclusions 
made and findings presented it seems that the integrative model's contention holds true in 
this case that the consociational institutions will be faced by ineffectiveness and deadlock 
(Caspersen, 2004, p. 574).  
 In the same study it was also noted, though, that 42% of all laws passed were coded 
as EU laws (Bahtic-Kunrath, 2011, p. 909). This suggests that laws of importance are 
nonetheless being passed. Also, on the BiH Parliamentary web page it is recorded that 177 
laws were passed for this given period (20.11.2006 - 29.11.2010) with the first law being 
passed in March of 2007 and the last in September of 2010 (Parlamentarna Skupstina, 
2013). Although this does not differ much from what was recorded in Bahtic-Kunrath 
(2011), but still it is useful to note. In addition, for this same period between 2006 and 2010 
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there were 127 laws which were rejected in the legislation process with the first law being 
rejected in December of 2006 and the last law in November 2010. Thus, the legislation, 
then, that actually made it into the Parliament to be processed consisted of 304 laws where 
about 58% of them were adopted, and on average 44 laws were passed per year. This 
finding suggests that the Parliament was faring slightly better since the 18 month period 
that Caspersen (2004) observed between 2001 and 2002 where close to 40 laws were 
passed.  
 In the most recent period there is a downturn in the trend that once again gives 
relevance to the contention pertaining to the integrative model. This recent period that is 
covered is set from the 30
th
 of November of 2010 up until the 20th of February of 2013, 
which is the date of the last law adopted thus far. There have been 37 laws adopted and 18 
rejected, the last of which was rejected in May of 2012. Only 37 laws being adopted in this 
period of about two years and three months is a sign of ineffectiveness (Parlamentarna 
Skupstina, 2013). It should be noted, though, that during this recent period there was great 
instability in BiH during the period of October 2010 to the end of December 2011, which 
was due to a backlash to an integrative measure. During this period of great instability there 
were only 16 laws passed, and even after the government was formed in the end of 2011 
there were problems with the then coalition throughout 2012, which further added to the 
instability until the coalition was rearranged. Much of the planned legislation is still left 
out, and one crucial legislation which is still pending is the Sejdic and Finci v. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, which the European Court of Human Rights ruled on in the end of 2009. The 
claim is that "the Bosnian constitution’s provisions with regard to the presidency, House of 
Peoples, and vital interest veto were discriminatory on the basis of race, religion and 
association with a national minority" (Human Rights Watch, 2012, p. 18).  
 The Parliament showed some improvement since Caspersen's conclusions, but for 
the most recent period it has worsened. However, on some important laws there has been 
consensus, such as with the population census, which was adopted at the end of January of 
2013. The population census is set to take place in October of 2013 (Al Jazeera Balkans, 
2013). This was one of the crucial setbacks for progress in BiH, as an up-to-date census is 
one of the necessary conditions for its process in applying for EU membership. Another 
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turn in events is the deal signed by the new governing coalition for furthering the reform 
process, as assessed in the analysis of political elite behaviour. In addition, now that there is 
a stable coalition it is likely that the process will pick up in the Parliament. Also, the deal 
on the reform process specified a need to improve on institutional equality, which implies a 
consideration of the Sejdic and Finci case.  
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Section 6: Conclusion 
 
 This current study tracked the contentions pertaining to the two models of conflict 
regulation which apply to BiH, the consociational and integrative. Both models have 
contentions regarding voting patterns, political elite behaviour and workings of the 
institutions. Thus, the questions regarding this work are: how have these trends, regarding 
the political environment fared since the study was last conducted and what can this tell us 
about the prospects of the further utilization of consociational elements in the power-
sharing system of BiH? The aim then, of the study, was to assess the trends in the political 
environment in order to reach recommendations on whether or not to support 
consociational elements and their improvement in BiH. It is argued here that the political 
environment in BiH is fit for consociational elements, and instead of deviating away from 
the use of consociational elements there should be an encouragement to improve them.  
 This study is largely based on Caspersen (2004) and the findings of this current 
study have been compared to the ones which were noted when her study was conducted. 
The following methods were utilized to assess the contentions and the subsequent trends of 
the political environment: observation of election results, assessment of compliance with 
the power-sharing arrangements and the nature of coalition building, and the workings of 
the Parliament. The point was to make sure all contentions pertaining to two models were 
assessed in order to be able to reach recommendations concerning the further utilization of 
consociational elements within BiH. Therefore, the argument relevant to this thesis would 
then be supported if trends favour the contentions pertaining to the consociational model 
and portray that the opposite is occurring to that of which the integrative model contends. 
However, if the trends held contrary to this then the claim of the argument would be 
weakened. Moreover, the study was conducted for the time period of 2004 and through to 
2012, but has also covered some developments from the early stages of 2013.  
 Since the current system is deemed as being largely ineffective altercations are 
required. The measures prescribed by the two models of conflict regulation are both valid 
for BiH. Thus, both options are available for consideration when the reform process 
becomes more active. Nonetheless, in BiH, there is a push towards putting more of an 
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emphasis on integrative measures and pressures to introduce new integrative measures. 
Therefore, this study provides insight on the political environment in BiH, and if it is fit for 
consociational democracy, before a potential shift away from consociational elements 
occurs.  
 The analysis in this study portrays that the trends hold more true for the contentions 
pertaining to the consociational model. First, with the contentions regarding voting 
patterns, what the consociational model contends is that heterogeneous units will foster 
greater extremism. The findings on voting pattern trends show that the voting share for 
nationalist support is higher than that of which was recorded by Caspersen (2004) in the 
second phase of her study. In addition, the nationalist voting share is higher in 
heterogeneous municipalities than in homogenous ones, and there are no indications of 
changes in the trend to show otherwise. When assessing political elite behaviour the 
contentions which were analyzed were: the acceptance of integrative measures, as the 
consociational model contends that integrative measures will not be welcomed and will 
face difficulties in getting established, and also if in heterogeneous units elected politicians 
would show willingness and the ability to engage in inter-ethnic cooperation, as is foreseen 
by the integrative model. The findings here portray that all the cases which had issues with 
power-sharing arrangements were heterogeneous ones. Hence, the disruptions in the 
governing of BiH has highly been due to integrative measures as they are not being 
welcomed and are facing difficulties in getting established. In addition elected politicians 
were reluctant to engage in inter-ethnic cooperation in heterogeneous units.  
 Another contention which was assessed in the analysis of political elite behaviour is 
that the consociational model professes that leaders from diverging groups will come 
together in order to avoid dangers posed by a society divided along hostile subcultures, that 
is when they become aware of such dangers. This is one of the trends which seems to 
weaken the support for the consociational model's use in BiH as leaders from the diverging 
groups are not effectively forming coalitions to stabilize tensions. In the analysis of the 
consociational institution, the Parliament, the findings suggest that it is faced with 
ineffectiveness, as is contended by the integrative model.  
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 Nevertheless, the recommendations reached in this study are to improve 
consociational elements already in place within the power-sharing structure of BiH. 
Improvements on the consociational elements would be able provide all sides with a level 
playing field and with guaranteed representation. When group status is more secure the 
diverging groups may be more inclined to support multi-ethnic appeal, and this applies for 
both the electorate and the political elite. It would seem more productive to keep the sides 
separated in their own spheres rather than encourage more integrative measures. In 
addition, the consociational elements may show signs of slow progress from time to time, 
but even with slow progress there are still signs of improvement, meanwhile with 
integrative measures there are full halts regarding progress and development. There are also 
new developments which show a turn in events for the two trends not favouring the 
consociational approach. One of these developments is that the new governing coalition has 
come to terms on a new deal concerning essential and long-awaited reforms. In BiH no 
political party is strong enough to form a government themselves and the need for coalition 
building is a given, and this process involves parties representative of different groups. In 
particular, this new ruling coalition has left out one of the largest Bosniak parties, the SDA, 
but still consists of the SDP and SBB. Thus, it will be interesting to see how processes will 
develop concerning this new deal with the SDA being in the opposition and subsequently 
disapproving of the deal made.  
 The other positive development regarding the consociational approach is that the 
progress in the Parliament seems to be improving as, recently, the legislation on conducting 
the population census, the first since 1991, was passed. Also, it is likely that it will continue 
to improve as a result of a stable ruling coalition. In addition, the Parliament itself is one 
example of where consociational elements can be improved. The veto provisions pertaining 
to the Parliament can be reformed in such a way where it would resemble how it is 
employed in the Presidency where each side is provided with an ethnic veto instead of a 
territorial one where Croats and Bosniaks, in a way, have to combine efforts to use the veto. 
It will further be interesting to see how the progress on the issue of the Sejdic and Finci 
case develops, as the implementation of the legislation concerning this case can improve 
the status of other minorities within BiH, as their rights and privileges would be more in 
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line with what the constituent peoples are entitled to. The developments in setting a date for 
conducting a population census and a potential implementation of the legislation 
concerning Sejdic and Finci may seem like small steps, but, regardless, passing laws which 
satisfy prospects of joining the EU is a sign that the quality of laws is improving. On one 
more note where the current system can become more effective along consociational 
elements is through the implementation of non-territorial autonomy so that minorities in 
isolated pockets would no longer be neglected. Thus, there are viable options available 
relating to the consociational approach, in improving the effectiveness of the current 
power-sharing arrangements, and rather than diverting away from consociational measures 
they should be pursued.  
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